CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Crisis Leadership

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‘...Basically, ...leadership studies is focused on STUDY while I have always been focused on LEARNING...’ [Professor John Adair, Chair in Leadership Studies, United Nations System Staff College, Turin, 2014].

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Introduction

What exactly is leadership in extreme situations? What are the key characteristics of an extreme event? How can we, in fact, approach crisis leadership, in a sense that it seems as a combination of theoretical and applied leadership with crisis management? Is crisis leadership a concept or a study field? How can, both, theory and practice be merged? Are classic crisis management and leadership theories sufficient for explaining ”human and institutional response behaviour” during extreme events? What organizational and external factors influence this (new) type of leadership? How high-level commanders and/leaders are expected to behave in extreme situations? How do they counter, absorb or reject (internal and external) pressures? How such circumstances impact on the decision-making process? Which skills, capabilities and competences high-level commanders/leaders need to have in order to effectively engage in extreme situations and manage crises? How can leaders influence team members and how they respond to stress? Which ethical standards, character traits, personal attitudes and integrity are actually needed? What is the role of education, training and knowledge? How do lessons-learned influence crisis leadership?

Since leadership is, to a great extent, thought to be influenced by context, then, do we assume that, when context changes, leadership does also? This is even more magnified in cases of unstable, unpredictable and uncertain contexts. Crisis environments are highly demanding since current operational contexts require a more adequate and effective response on behalf of commanders and leaders involved. When threat and fear become overwhelming, leaders facing a crisis need to show adaptation, commitment to priorities, clear understanding of roles, vision, and team spirit. Leading in extreme situations, as a human effort, is influenced by individual attributes, as leaders are expected to assume responsibility for team members’ performance, as well as for their own.

Leadership in extreme military contexts, as a topic, draws theoretical inspiration and cognitive base from a series of disciplines, such as sociology, management, political science, psychology, mathematics. Thus, core competencies from crisis management field can be applied to crisis leadership: preparation capacity; sense-making; decision-making. Crisis leadership research, then, should be combined with existing crisis management literature. Crisis contexts, on the one hand, and extreme/dangerous situations, on the other, might be different, compatible or complementary. There are certainly similarities, in nature, since war, combat or conflict zones constitute extreme contexts in which armed forces operate. This is, especially
true, as, currently, MOOTW, PKOs and HOs have become a predominant factor in global security environment.

Since Vietnam war, we have witnessed a series of dramatic changes in leadership philosophy coupled with critical organizational transformation in western militaries, as national armed forces were engaging in a huge number of global military operations (other that war), since then. Advances in technology and equipment, changes in the international social and political environment, and the increased participation in PSOs, have all led to a growing demand for a new type of leaders, at all levels of command. Standard Army officers’ education and training for crisis situations is extensive, as combat /war situations are typical crisis contexts. They demand stress-management, flexibility, comfortability in making quick and proper decisions, and team respect. This can be gained, beyond training, through assignments in military missions and operations in dangerous and uncertain environments, worldwide. Leaders, not only at high, but, also, junior and mid levels, need to be properly equipped to respond to crises by showing responsibility, integrity and critical judgment. Stress, anxiety, insecurity, fear produced by a crisis, all represent a huge challenge for leaders, while, attention needs to be put on factors like confusion and chaos normally revealed during crises.

Crisis leadership is dependent on individual emotions, needs, senses and behaviours. Here, perceptions and misperceptions may cause difficulties, while individual and team emotions may confront: how do leaders experience in extremis situations and which factors and contexts affect outcomes? How do Army leaders in in extremis situations make sense of the environment and lead their teams? How do factors, such as training, personality and experience, potentially affect military leaders’ behavior during in extremis situations?

Leadership skills are based on theory, tradition and experience. However, these competences -conditional and adjustable to occurring threats-, need to be developed, not only by senior commanders and/ or leaders, but by all team members /units, as, in a modern combat environment, leadership must be exercised at all command levels: leadership needs to be demonstrated! In extreme contexts, emotional intelligence, situation-awareness and self-efficacy are expected to influence the flow of information and communication among team members and subordinates. When performing tasks, in a context, where internal and external factors intervene, they need to overcome danger, ambiguity and fear: personal and collective. Officers who can show a sense of duty, self-confidence, mental integrity and flexibility, are

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2 Ioannis Ant. Ragies, ‘Participation of Greece in UN PSOs,’ Issues in Defence and Policy, No. 10, April 2001 (in greek), 9-19
those who can function effectively in dangerous environments. These elements, combined, will prove necessary to form choices, make right decisions, project mission objectives and vision, and communicate them timely. In doing this, any negative challenges need to be overcome: unreliable information; not-clear objectives; mission modifications; situational novelties. Here, an important concept, highlighted in such a process, is collateral learning, focusing, not only, on the content of learning, but, also, on the process, per se, as this is critical in preparing leaders to operate in extreme situations. The essence of collateral learning\(^3\) is on all those experiences and insights gathered during learning process, which will form the basis for understanding the overall framework of leaders’ learning, reacting and performing in extreme contexts. In dangerous environments, trusting yourself is not enough: need also to trust your own judgment -based on all indirect gains during learning\(^4\).

This e-book is not a definite or comprehensive work, a new theoretical work, nor a technical manual of standard and/ or pre-described crisis procedures. It is, rather, a synthesis of traditional and modern approaches to leadership with crisis management theory and practice, exclusively focused on the military and combat contexts in which they operate. As it is intended for a specific audience, cadets of Military Academies and Universities of EU, it aims at facilitating mobility of knowledge, skills and competences amongst future military officers, their teachers and Institutions. Modern military operations, so-called “other than war”, have acquired a considerable importance in European Union’s CSDP, built to maintain and enforce regional and international peace and stability. In such an environment, European military forces are required to adapt to new functions and roles and adjust capabilities and doctrines. EU member-states, in many aspects, are not capable to act unilaterally on the international scene. Therefore, (basic and advanced) education and training of European military officers should give priority to the values of flexibility and open-mindedness necessary to create adequate European military capabilities.

These values must be taught to future military commanders and leaders, during initial education and training stages, since, most of them, will be engaged in international military operations, very early in their careers. Most European armed forces, to perform this, have already entered into a hard process of becoming familiar with these new realities. Mobility during basic education and exchanging cadets -future leaders- and instructors, pose a true

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\(^4\) *Ibid*
challenge to EU’s military since it mobilises logistical and financial resources, creates strong political commitment and builds a clear willingness for organizational transformation.
1. EVOLVING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

1.1. Spectrum of Conflicts

In current security environment, states are faced with an increasing array of regional and international challenges, risks and threats (security, societal, ethnic, economic, and political). The military, the professional entity tasked with preserving peace and preparing for war to maintain it, remains, also, the main organization responsible for engaging in these complex non-military security contexts, prepared for countering such threats. Thus, it is estimated that skills and knowledge officers will need, today and in the near future, have changed due to specific circumstances altered by the increasing number of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. To respond, timely and effectively, modern military forces must develop and maintain a high degree of adaptability: officers must learn and embody enduring principles of combat and warfare, based on effective command and leadership. On the other hand, their teaching and training should, for that purpose, adapt to meet contemporary challenges, demands, gaps and opportunities. Furthermore, beyond demonstrating a high degree of proficiency in waging conventional warfare, officers must, also, develop a broader cognitive basis on politics, economics, and information / communication technologies, as connected with modern warfare in a complicated and rapidly-evolving international security environment.

Additionally, emerging strategic level threats increasingly require new types of attributes and career-development techniques. This, in turn, will lead to a rethinking of the balance between the necessity to engage specialists/experts, as well as to define new specific responsibilities and requirements, at all ranks: high-rank, and field- & company-grade officers. Military leaders must, on their side, determine proper balances between expertise and strategic-thinking capabilities necessary for senior leadership. Current complex international operations demand military officers who can demonstrate a clear, comprehensive, understanding of battle environment and a robust capacity to integrate capabilities in order to achieve mission success. They must comprehend, both, capabilities and mission objectives for units or platforms they command, as well as roles of forces from other services, allied nations, civilian government agencies, IGOs and NGOs⁵.

⁵ Republic of Ireland / General Staff of the Defence Forces, Defence Forces Leadership Doctrine, 2016, 1-3.
State and non-state actors have been using conventional and high-end methods, in a wide series of combined operations, even, hybrid warfare. Conflicts are emerging at global, regional and local level, in the form of conventional, non-conventional, terrorism, destabilisation, insurgency or cyber-warfare. Many states are developing national security strategies accepting that, due to increased interdependence and globalization, national security is, now, connected to regional and global security changes. This broader concept of national security- contrary to traditional national defence concept- encompasses certain new threats such as natural disasters, cyber security and terrorism. It is clear that NATO & EU and their member-states/partner states currently face collective security threats, more diverse, less visible and less predictable, in nature. As a consequence, they engage, actively, in global and regional institutional bodies for crisis management purposes, in order to limit instability, tension and conflicts.

UN’s mandated military missions and operations are among those instruments used by international community in responding to such threats. In this context, military leaders must reflect upon and operate within this new operating environment: complex, unknown, contested, inter-connected and continuously challenging. Modern military operations are rarely conducted against structured forces, with defined hierarchy and organization, but are, rather, undertaken against more diverse adversaries in different circumstances and conditions. Operational environments though challenging, they cannot cancel the fundamental nature and character of (traditional) conflicts: capabilities, forces and doctrines are still required for planning and conducting a broad range of activities referred to as, the, full spectrum of military operations. On the other hand, the focus of campaign-planning in modern operations has shifted from the, destruction of a belligerent force to the winning the support of people and public opinion. This war among people places a premium on small-unit operations where forces are interacting with local actors and populations in the field. Success, thus, depends on understanding and (often) resolving political and societal issues, especially, central, in intra-state conflicts, on winning hearts and minds and on facilitating processes for an effective resolution to crises/conflicts. Military leaders must remain aware of the wider defence, economic and geopolitical context,

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as well as of various local ethnic, cultural and religious groups living in areas where their units are being deployed. They must understand *Comprehensive Approach* concept\(^{10}\) to problem-solving and crisis-management, involving CIMIC techniques and tools in collaborative activities and collective responses\(^{11}\). To the extent possible, leaders are required, at any time, to perform as soldiers, while thinking, creatively and critically, as this quality has become absolutely decisive in conducting successful military operations and in building effective leadership.

All these actually apply at a time when the world is transforming in a fundamental way: advances in technology continue to present both opportunities and threats while societies have become so increasingly dependent on such technologies that potential vulnerabilities can be easily exploited by radical, extremist, terrorist groups. Cyber-crime and cyber-attacks keep exploiting these vulnerabilities. Military leaders must be conscious of technology changes and any resulting vulnerabilities, while remaining aware of how the military think, interact and respond in order to achieve mission success and superiority.

1.2. **Combat Leadership**

While there are innumerable approaches on what leadership is about, it remains difficult to define exactly effective leadership. There are various myths surrounding leadership theories: *leaders are born not made; leaders must be charismatic; may have unblemished lives; leadership is another expression of management*. Practice, on the other hand, tries to bridge these generalisations: *leaders are born and made; leaders do the right thing(s); and leaders manage and managers lead*. Though there have been, so far, five generations of theory in leadership literature, but, none mutually exclusive or totally time-bound: behavioural theorists argued that whatever leaders do this is important, not just what traits they possess. Primary theories have identified leadership styles of autocratic and democratic nature, while recent have analyzed directive and participative styles. While leadership doctrines describe how to interact with subordinates and how to improve skills and competences, leaders must always be themselves: anything else is fake, bluff and insincere. Effective leaders must adjust styles and

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techniques against situations, peers and subordinates: single-style leaders will remain inflexible and will probably face difficulties in situations where that certain style doesn’t fit. On the other hand, leaders who rely exclusively on the directive style, only get a short-term commitment from their subordinates, while discouraging teamwork, risk-taking and innovation.

The same argument applies to transactional and transformational styles. In leadership there are no right answers/solutions, as answers/solutions depend on you (understanding yourself and others - how you behave), your situation, style, and culture and context in which you operate. Professional identity, credibility, conduct-style and personality/ethical standards, have made the military a fundamental institution. Armed forces, as a military organization, are based on confident leaders with character, competence, strengthened by values of respect, loyalty, selflessness, physical and moral courage, and, above all, integrity.

Combat leadership represents a different type of leadership where leaders must clearly understand their military profession and their soldiers, while remaining strong tacticians, great decision-makers, effective soldiers’ motivators -especially when operating in dangerous contexts-, as well as critical combat task-executors. They must use techniques to inspire and lead soldiers against an adversity, through proper preparation, planning, and training. Realistic training, being developed upon critical tasks and battle drills, remains a primary source for building resilience and confidence in order to win. It is leader competence, confidence, agility, and courage that all combined, help units survive and offer proper solutions to crises and unexpected situations. Warrior ethos and resilience are those specific qualities to mobilize, overcome fear and fatigue and accomplish mission. Thus, it is important for soldiers to acquire and maintain a warrior mindset when serving. In difficult conditions, leaders may need to carry on for long periods, while soldiers may face difficulties, not only related to physical danger, but, also, to a great physical, emotional, and mental strain. A meaningful mission with constraints and high-demanding standards causes basic stress. Therefore, to render conditions more realistic, leaders must adjust basic stress-levels, during training, in order to create a demanding simulated learning environment.

An essential part of warrior mentality is discipline, as it keeps team coherence, while resilience, ethos, competence, and confidence, all can motivate soldiers to carry on mission against any obstacles. All these, backed by professional competences help them fighting under extreme conditions:

‘’...the leader who would become a competent tactician must first close his mind to the alluring formulae that well-meaning people offer in the name of victory... to master his difficult art he must learn to cut to the
heart of the situation, recognize its decisive elements and base his course of action on these...the ability to do this is not God-given, nor can it be acquired overnight; it is a process of years...he must realize that training in solving problems of all types, long practice in making clear, unequivocal decisions, the habit of concentrating on the question at hand, and an elasticity of mind, are indispensable requisites for the successful practice of the art of war...”

Creative thinking techniques help to generate new information, while critical thinking reveals differences that would otherwise be not-visible: this type of thinking helps to fill in any knowledge gaps to terminate uncertainty. Practical thinking includes a willingness to seek alternate approaches to (traditional/formal) thinking, thus, preparing to take into account other views instead of dismissing them. As there are no perfect guidelines for success, improvement requires self-reflection, commitment and hard work, while improved thinking strategies are expected to lead to greater self-confidence levels.

Combat operations full of unknown risks and hazards are conducted in intense, dangerous situations. Combat leaders must effectively command and lead their troops in challenging contexts, against enemies aiming at destroying them and/or preventing them from accomplishing their mission. The challenge for combat leadership is to mentally prepare leaders to make right decisions, at the right time, through exposing them to real-life conditions (e.g., simulations and case-studies). This would possibly determine those qualities and characteristics of successful leadership on which future leaders tend to model themselves. Another critical aspect in combat leadership is acting: doing the right things at the right time, while knowing what decisions to be made and when and how to be implemented. However, decisions that need to be made tend to be more complicated as the level of command increases. A commander must be prepared, not only to react to adversary’s actions and decisions, but, also, to overcome any limitations involved, demonstrating willingness strength. This will assist self-development, measurement of acquired knowledge and control over others’ thinking and actions.

Thus, decision-making is more art than science, more qualitative than quantitative. Commanders are often characterized as capable of viewing and understanding the entire battlefield while controlling their unit’s combat engagement. As technology led tactics being further developed, commanders operating in a wider battle space, tend to remove from the field

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and, increasingly, become dependent more on subordinates and communication systems concerning intelligence collection and sharing. Then, heroic leadership, where commander leads from the front, becomes equal to classical leadership, when combat character requires a leader not only to command his units, but to lead them in the battle.

If we move forward, however, commander is rather removed from the front line and immediate danger, observing the battle and managing combat resources. But, in time of crises, anti-heroic leader places himself at the front with his soldiers to, both, inspire and lead: anti-heroic commander uses situational leadership to dictate his position in the battlefield\textsuperscript{13}. Unheroic leaders, on the other, never lead from the front, but direct others while maintaining an overarching view of the battlefield. In the false-heroic model, leader pretends to be heroic ignoring any sound and wise advice given by experienced subordinates—a type of leadership style also described as \textit{pseudo-transformational}\textsuperscript{14}. In nuclear era, post-heroic leader is defined in terms of a transformational leader: the introduction of nuclear weapons into classic warfare has further complicated the role of politico-military leader: leader is simply not only concerned with \textit{battlefield}: since his actions could have catastrophic consequences for mankind, he must also consider social and moral aspects when making decisions. The art of leading is both situational and transformational:

\begin{quote}
\textit{``...leading \textit{``is the art of dealing with humanity, of working diligently on behalf of men, of being sympathetic with them, but equally of insisting that they make a square facing towards their own problems...''}\textsuperscript{15}.}
\end{quote}

Leaders must recognise that contemporary operating environment is complex and dynamic. This requires them to be alert, reflexive, and capable of influencing subordinates, peers and other actors outside the chain of command, when executing military operations, especially, in foreign territories. Therefore, leadership becomes critical to survival and success, as leaders must remain able to think and act creatively and influence actions, beliefs, values and emotions of others. Being a \textit{leader} is, then, personal, as it flows directly from individual characters, competences and behaviours.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{13} J. Keegan. \textit{The Mask of Command} (New York: Penguin Press, 1988), 1-13, 92-155.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{14} B. Bass, \textquoteleft Two Decades of Research and Development in Transformational Leadership,\textquoteright European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 1999, 8 (1), 9-32.}
\end{footnotes}
1.3. Strategic Leadership and Strategic Thinking

Members of the military tend to approach strategy in a, rather, limiting manner when planning for and conducting military operations. In fact, this concept is much broader and long-term in nature. Strategy is fundamentally about making decisions, planning tactics and building capabilities. However, although there is a clear conceptual distinction between leadership and management processes, the preferred type of influence, command, is rather a mixture of others: sometimes it is appropriate to lead or, more appropriate, to, either manage or command\textsuperscript{16}. Furthermore, all influence methods tend to be associated with a particular way of thinking (mindset) or style: leadership requires an engaging approach, where those in charge interact with others in order to explore problem-definition and problem-solution, as they admit that they do not readily have the ideal answer/solution\textsuperscript{17}. Former CA Frank Hickling (Australian Defence Forces) has noted that:

\textit{“…it’s intriguing to note the disproportionate volume of literature dealing with command in war versus senior leadership in peace…. senior leadership in peace is not particularly sexy!” … the role “offers a level of satisfaction beyond anything I had experienced anywhere else.”}\textsuperscript{18}

While leaders need to bring their own expertise into this process, leadership requires those individuals who do not wish to appear as sources of expertise on everything\textsuperscript{19}. However, they also need to develop, in a less tangible but equally significant manner, interpersonal qualities and engagement skills needed to mobilize commitment, spirit and expertise of followers (individuals, groups/teams). On the other hand, management requires a more analytical and systematic approach, based on an \textit{a priori} assumption that individuals with authority and power (should) know the right thing, as well as exactly how to best manage “critical” and complex issues. The ability to influence others is much more complicated as most actions carried out by officers require both lead and manage and, depending on tasks, appointment and prevailing circumstances, command, as well\textsuperscript{20}. However, it is expected that, in an organisation like the military, senior officers need strong influential skills. They must not only be open-minded and properly-skilled in engaging

\textsuperscript{16} Nicholas Jans, Stephen Mugford, Jamie Cullens, and Judy Frazer-Jans. The Chiefs. A Study of Strategic Leadership. (Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics, Australian Defence College, 2013), 15
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, 16
\textsuperscript{18} Nicholas Jans, et all (2013), Op. Cit., 9
\textsuperscript{20} Nicholas Jans, et all (2013), Op. Cit., 16-17
others, but also be competent managers, able to take effective and clear command during crises\textsuperscript{21}. Here, \textit{personality} and \textit{intellectual agility} help senior officers to remain capable of and comfortable with any \textit{influence} requirements. Although the task of \textit{leadership} is, perhaps, something that senior officers have to do only occasionally (if, ever), the task of management is a, rather, \textit{routine} task. Nevertheless, even if senior officers need to practise leadership only (\textit{quite}) rarely, they still need to do it \textit{skilfully}\textsuperscript{22}.

Strategic leadership is the process of planning and supervising decision-making within an integrated policy-making process, through stimulating commitment and building strategic leadership alliances to accomplish certain objectives. As it is accepted that uncertainty is inherent in any situation, then, strategic leadership process becomes difficult, as defining the nature of the problem \textit{per se} is a hard initial task to do. As no single individual can have all answers/solutions, managing complex strategic issues requires a unified effort: cross command-level interaction; inter-agency cooperation; trans-national/allied coordination. Commanders cannot be expected to have immediate answers on all issues, however, as they become engaged and, lead processes, they are required to develop answers, choices and solutions. Furthermore, it needs to be emphasized that strategic goals can produce tension, in the sense that each cannot be fully achieved except at some \textit{expense} to another\textsuperscript{23}.

Strategic leaders lead from the front to establish a high-level team-work at the top, in parallel, as they, also, lead from the shadows by shaping the conditions that would encourage such collaboration to cascade down\textsuperscript{24}. The most important difference between leadership, at tactical/operational level, and strategic, is the necessity to take into account the specific governmental collective thinking. Strategic leadership activities typically entail, in some cases, management and command, although, in others, leadership. In engaging others in the process, leaders need to work in a way that avoids a situation becoming trapped in a \textit{paralysis by analysis} situation\textsuperscript{25}: this reinforces the earlier point that those at the top need to be skilled in, both, management and leadership. Many issues encountered at the strategic level do not involve great complexity although remain complicated and demand \textit{management} as the appropriate influence style. On the other hand, when a crisis arises, then \textit{command} becomes the appropriate influence style\textsuperscript{26}.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid}  \\
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid}, 17  \\
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibid}, 18-19  \\
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Ibid}, 17-20  \\
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid}  \\
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid}
\end{flushleft}
To quote Angus Houston, AC, AFC, former CDF (Australian Defence Forces) view on this:

“... you need to be able to work in the same space as others in the room. You need to empathise with the various ‘tribes’: the three Services, the APS and the politicians...you need to be able to frame your arguments in terms they understand, focus on the key strategic issues, work them through, and present sensible options...while the government will make the decision, you can influence the government to make the right decision...there is an art in influencing the government to make the right decision, and it requires skill, strategic appreciation and guile. 27...”

As long as performance levels are concerned, usually, it is widely accepted that fundamental issues depend on leaders’ own performance. However, to avoid managing underlying issues is still a difficult task as it requires advanced competencies and strategic leadership techniques. While institutional contexts could offer explanations for the absence of thinking strategically, in the military, it can be argued that, to avoid performance vulnerabilities, strategic leaders must perform four roles, as follows:

a) **strategic director**, to keep traditional “heroic leader” identity in perspective and be conscious of avoiding over-playing directive function b) **strategic leader**, to mentally shift gears about the nature of “leading” and think broadly and imaginatively about what is likely to happen in the longer term and about how influence can be exercised in intra- and inter-organisational networks c) **strategic builder**, to acquire broader skills and a more sophisticated understanding of professional and organisational behaviour d) steward of the profession, to “think institutionally” so as to balance pursuit of short-term objectives with the maintenance of long-term social capability elements (such as an appropriate ethical climate) 28.

Based on professional expertise, experience, personality and training, senior military officers can become effective decision makers. Although strategic decision-making literature verifies, in fact, that this is a purely structural organizational problem, it is true that military profession has become particularly vulnerable especially, since national armed forces have been engaging in MOOTW and PSOs. One inadvertent consequence of overplaying the role of decisive leader is the effect it has on subordinates’ willingness to engage with problem-solving process and offer their contribution and feedback 29; when leaders show control of a situation and, possibly, demonstrate answers/ solutions, they will inevitably send subliminal signals to

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27 Ibid, 20
28 Ibid, 93-95
29 Ibid
their junior colleagues that any additional information/differentiated views are *unwelcome*!\(^{30}\) Effective performance at the strategic level requires strong abilities and willingness to start thinking in a different manner. This will, in turn, require attributes like, strategic acumen and mental agility, in order to explore the environment, check its characteristics, clarify situation, set priorities and describe directions for the organization and its members.

Risk, as a factor causing uncertainty on accomplishing organizational objectives, is present everywhere and, typically, can be viewed as an opportunity or a threat. Though perceived as calculated, in most cases, accepting it is *in principle* critical: risk must be identified, managed, mitigated and/or, eliminated at the proper level. As there are inherent risks in, both, military training and combat contexts, assuming risk remains a basic task of military leaders. On the other hand, it is the responsibility of strategic leadership to outline risk management strategies, to be applied, at tactical, operational and strategic level, while failure to accomplish could have serious impact.

Strategic leaders must coordinate actions with other agencies, demonstrating a clear commitment and an ability to foster appropriate peacetime contacts with other armed forces. To provide purpose and direction, they use a range of planning tools, decision-making analytical tools, such as: *a) Military Decision Making Processes (MDMP)* *b) Strategic Risk Analysis, Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT)* *c) Political, Economic, Social, Technical, Legal, Environmental – Military Analysis (PESTLE-M)* *d) Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) Analysis*, amongst others.

### 1.4. Military Decision-Making Process

Decision-making is about knowing *if, when and what* to decide, while, at the same time, clearly understanding all potential consequences of any single decision or a combination of them. Decisions are those means through which commanders and leaders, at all levels, implement plans, objectives and visions. As an integral part of crisis-management, it is considered as, both, a science and an art: some aspects in the planning and executing military operations (*equipment, systems, weapons*) are quantifiable and, as such, they belong to the science of war-or war studies or military science or strategic studies. Others (*command, leadership, conduct of operations, threat perceptions, in extremis behavior*), belong to the art

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\(^{30}\) *Ibid*
of war -or operational art or military strategy. Military decision-making process (MDMP) is a single, established, and proven Army’s analytical approach to problem-solving. It is a tool that assists commanders and staff in developing estimates and choices regarding a plan. MDMP’s analytical aspects cover the whole spectrum and levels of military operations. Decision-making in extreme and crisis contexts is concerned with forming choices, predicting outcomes, considering alternatives, executing. MDMP is Army’s basic multi-level problem-solving process, a standardized method of situation analysis through information / data evaluation and optimal solution pursuit. As a proven, useful and elastic method in routine and, mainly, unexpected situations, it has become necessary to commanders as a critical element in any successful military operation. It is, thus, a systematic method in initial and advanced military education and training.

2. MILITARY LEADERSHIP: CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCES

2.1. Context Levels

It is widely accepted that what is interesting is not military leadership per se, but the specific context in which it is exercised. True, as military context imposes unique constraints on leadership process, thus, rendering the application of leadership, to a large extent, clearly dependent upon it: when context changes leadership also changes. In the military domain, leadership is described as contextual, because context is considered as the primary construct. Two levels of military context can influence leadership processes:

a) institutional context: unique cultures, social systems, social processes, social identity forces operate within military profession/military forces which represent nation-states that are granted legitimacy and professional jurisdiction and develop and employ their expertise under a professional military ethic b) combat operating environment: military forces operate in, describing how these contexts, marked by their austerity, lethality, complexity, and moral intensity impose distinct contingencies and causations on leaders and followers individually, and to groups and organizations collectively.

Additionally, military professionals build their own expertise [doctrine], coupled with professional ethics in order to operate effectively. They are prepared to conduct specific missions in their jurisdiction, often under strict legal and/or political (executive) directions (combat operations, strategic deterrence, stability operations, homeland security, offensive and defensive combat operations).

2.2. Extreme and non-Extreme Environment

National militaries remain obliged to develop (general or specific) military leadership doctrines. This, however, is problematic, as each nation and service develops its own unique expertise, obeys to different organizational culture and does not follow similar learning and training processes. However, all militaries operate across operating contexts that are all extreme, in nature. In an extreme context, all critical elements like, danger, fear and uncertainty

can develop in many forms, varied levels of extremity and probability of occurrence. There is a clear difference between extreme contexts and extreme events: while a combat zone may be considered an extreme context, a deployment is likely punctuated by a series of extreme events\textsuperscript{34}. Effective leadership in a military environment ultimately depends on a leader’s capacity to lead a unit across stages in an extreme event – also, serving as an indicator of future response. Therefore, it is important for leadership theories to address how leadership actually influences such a transition, in a sense that a given leadership approach related to a stage may easily be inappropriate or ineffective in another.

2.3. Dimensions of Extreme Contexts

Research suggests that more intense threats can create negative responses and produce terror, high stress levels and other debilitating emotional responses\textsuperscript{35}. The range of potential consequences is expected to affect moral sensitivity, in a given dangerous situation, stressing any ethical implications of individuals’ actions. Concerning unit readiness, on the other, threat perceptions (probability level) will also influence it: when perception level is low, organizations will likely remain unconcerned, while, when high, people are intrinsically motivated to prepare their engagement in a dangerous environment. Therefore, level and probability of extreme events influence human reaction and also leadership processes. It was suggested that extreme contexts vary in proximity\textsuperscript{36}, where this is defined by physical proximity, such as whether one is on the front line or in a rear echelon unit. Proximity has also psychological characteristics, as it is related to the closeness to the danger: even if not physically close to a danger, individuals may demonstrate high levels of danger extremity.

In combat contexts, though all are extreme, the military operate in different contexts and perform varied missions. What remains consistent is that they all train and prepare (in all aspects) to operate in extreme contexts. Differentiated dimensions of extreme contexts can facilitate the understanding and evaluation of military leadership and the identification of any differences in leadership across national militaries. Historically, it is clear that some national militaries are more likely to engage in mortal combat than others, as well as to conduct major versus minor level combat operations, thus varying in magnitude and probability of extremity

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
-participation of national forces in UN PSOs. While some theoretical constructs could be generally applied across any military context, the multidimensional and multinational character of current combat contexts and operations would actually render the usefulness of normative theories on military leadership, rather, inappropriate, in scientific terms\textsuperscript{37}.

Defining leadership in a military context, it can be noted that wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men \textit{(Gen. George S. Patton)}. It is the spirit of soldiers who follow and of those who lead that gains victory. As made clear, military leadership is a human endeavor, not unlike leadership \textit{(versus management)} in an organization. Yet, military leadership occurs in the arena of armed combat where leaders' decisions have direct, immediate and long-term effect on human life and the fate of nations\textsuperscript{38}. Based on military leadership studies, with a focus on how context can affect leadership processes, a deeper and wider understanding of leadership can be gained. Leadership in combat is based on a systems approach, since complex, extreme and potentially violent military environments do not allow to any leader to manage insecurity, stress, tension, instability, and unpredictability of a specific extreme context, himself.

Leadership is an opportunity to unveil individual and collective human and organizational capacities and build an effective and ethical combat power to be engaged in dynamic and dangerous contexts. Based on research and evidence, leadership is influenced by all internal and external contextual factors which are to be found in dangerous military contexts.

\textsuperscript{37} Ioannis Ant. Ragies, 'Participation of Greece in UN PSOs,' \textit{Op. Cit.} 37-41
3. COMMAND, MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP

3.1. Stability Operations

The wide concept of stabilization operations - or, security-building or crisis management operations peace enforcement, peace-making, peacekeeping, intervention, and reconstruction operations - is a process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support the preconditions for successful long-term development. They cover a whole spectrum, from prevention, intervention, and post-event activities. Though national doctrines can demonstrate variations, while similar, in essence, they are formed to assist and provide a toolbox which commanders and leaders can use. Such operations can be based on consent or not, involving international and/or local communities, actors, nation-states, coalitions, and regional/international organizations.

The application of military force alone does not guarantee success, and any decision should be made on a desired outcome or end-state (political objective). Exactly, this strategic element has a critical impact on tactical/operational planning: there is a necessity to coordinate efforts, agencies and stakeholders, in a theatre of operations, towards a single purpose and through unified effort. Here, due consideration in planning and functioning structures is needed to properly manage this process: UN has an extremely wide Mandate capability, but no troops; NATO has forces, but not proper agency support; EU has sufficient military potential and needed agencies, but no real political motivation amongst member-states. International organizations are being, widely, involved in PSOs and CROs.

A baseline for stability operations is provided through a conceptual framework of Command, Leadership & Management/CLM. Here, Command is the power or authority earned by rank, position, experience, or expertise. Leadership is the art, the application of personal qualities, knowledge, skills, and behavior to influence and inspire others to follow and succeed. Management is the science, the application of necessary functions to achieve aims. Command, thus, can be defined by the formula:

\[ \text{Command} = \text{Leadership} + \text{Management} \]

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41 Dave Fielder. Defining Command, leadership and Management Success factors Within Stability Operations. (PKSOII PAPER, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College / Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, June 2011), 17
Leadership qualities are listed as judgment, bearing, will-power, integrity, intelligence, confidence, courage, and knowledge, while management functions, as planning, organizing, controlling, coordinating, supporting, communicating, evaluating, and encouraging. Both factors in this formula are vital and complementary: without one, command will fall apart\textsuperscript{42}. However, it is, eventually, ethos that will ensure motivation, especially, in the context of stability operations, based on the trinity of \textit{Command, Leadership and Management/ CLM}. These three CLM factors can be combined, in the sense that this whole process constitutes an art, rather than a science. A view suggesting that solution to events or problems is required to use a combination of all three factors can be expressed as\textsuperscript{43}:

\textit{Problem Solving} = \textit{Command} + \textit{Leadership} + \textit{Management}.

The level of necessary input from each factor varies, depending on the nature of issues encountered, as well as the type of solution (\textit{direct, immediate}): in stability operations, early stages can often require immediate response (based on consideration) in order to avoid any negative outcomes. Military doctrine is concerned with command, as a key element in combat and vital to ensure success on any military operation: a vested authority for planning, directing, and coordinating military forces. The exercise of command encompasses authority, responsibility, and duty to act\textsuperscript{44}.

Leadership integrates persuasion, compulsion, and personal example, to manage ambiguous and complex issues. This would require a leadership style engaging high collaboration levels. In the context of stability operations, this involves high-level diplomatic initiatives, negotiations, and building authority for intervention. Most of all, it requires a strong leadership commitment to guide it through the end state. The necessary level of collaboration need not be extensive. Thoughtful consideration is needed. There is no difference between leadership and management, as these CLM factors are a part of the same overall capability required\textsuperscript{45}: leadership is about causing change and management is about maintaining status quo. Effective operational performance requires leadership at all levels, however, when focusing on the concept of management, it is clear that what prevails is the maintenance of the status quo. Stability operations are designed and implemented to lead from chaos to stability; from danger to security; from poverty to prosperity.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid, 17-18
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, 18
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid, 19-20
Management requires a range of techniques and skills to develop and facilitate planning. Occasionally, strategic management may be perceived as less important than leadership, however both functions are critical in capability-building. Successful merge of leadership and management may prove central to effective command. Leadership and management are not mutually exclusive. Both are necessary: while management is associated with planning, organising and co-ordinating, leadership is concerned with changing, directing and inspiring\(^{46}\). History shows that where leadership was neglected in favour of management consequences were regrettable\(^{47}\).

### 3.2. United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping

‘’...UN Multidimensional Approach is a comprehensive, coherent, and integrated approach to the maintenance of international peace and security by preventing conflicts, preventing relapse, and building sustainable peace through effective preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building strategies [UNSC Resolution 2086, July 21, 2013]...’’

The novel, complex and multidimensional nature of current Peacekeeping Operations /PKOs requires senior mission leaders capable of effectively handling a wide array of challenges, tasks and duties. UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations and UN Department for Field Support have been, for a long time, engaged in developing guidance for senior mission leadership aiming at adapting to evolving contexts in which PKOs are deployed\(^{48}\). Thus, any peacekeeping doctrine remains important reflecting the complexities involved in implementing UN Security Council Mandates.

UN DPKO, after a long and detailed consultation process, had developed a study, *Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations*, commonly known as *Capstone Doctrine* (2008). United Nations peacekeeping doctrinal framework is divided into six (6) main guidance series (1000–6000), which provide basic reference codes for the organization and management of internal DPKO/DFS policy and guidance materials\(^{49}\). Each series is further subdivided into specific thematic and/or functional areas. More specifically, 1000-Series: *Capstone Doctrine* covers the basic principles and key concepts underpinning the planning and

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\(^{47}\) Ibid.  
conduct of contemporary UN PKOs as well as their core functions and the main factors affecting their success. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines sits at the highest level in the 1000-series. 1000-series guidance also includes the Handbook on United Nations Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operations. All subordinate guidance must be consistent with the principles and concepts set out in the 1000-series.

Capstone Doctrine’s real intention was not to prescribe a DPKO doctrine but, rather, to identify and debate all necessary concepts to operationalize the three strands of contemporary peacekeeping. In this way, it would essentially contribute to a wider understanding of senior mission leadership, a further conceptual thinking and a deeper comprehension of the core functions of multidimensional PSOs. Clear objective here remains the development of operational level guidance for DPKO’s peacekeeping field practitioners. There is a multitude of tasks and actions needed to support UN/SC Mandates designed to handle an immediate post-conflict environment towards sustainable peace. Current multidimensional peacekeeping missions though possessing political leadership, often lacking the necessary authority, budget, expertise or resources to undertake all tasks mandated.

To ensure that PK missions remain focused on their essential roles, Capstone Doctrine gives guidance at the strategic level - although principles and guidelines apply to all levels- and identifies core functions as follows:

a) create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security with full respect for the rule of law and human rights
b) facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance

c) provide a framework for ensuring that all UN and other international actors pursue their activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

Linking strategic and tactical level, operational level offers the ground for various complex lines of activity to be bridged and integrated into one plan. This is the responsibility of Mission Leadership Team /MLT, led by Head of Mission /HoM. Further research needs to use a comprehensive approach, focusing on and navigating throughout operational level, thus, offering a helpful reference document for senior field commanders and leaders.

Effective leadership exercised by MLT is arguably the single most important factor for the success of all peacekeeping operations: under such leadership, UN missions can optimize

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51 Ibid, 11-12
the use of scarce resources, motivate personnel, clarify objectives, set proper examples for host nation, and strengthen the credibility and reputation of the organization. UN PK missions are increasingly complex, requiring imaginative and dedicated leadership grounded in integrity and competence. On the other, the multi-faceted nature of PKOs is fully documented in lessons -learned taken from a multitude of missions over past six decades. These lessons are reflecting hopes, expectations and anxieties of the international community in a continually changing global environment. They, also, recognize the increasing incidence of intra-state conflict, the strengthening of regional entities, and the greater presence of non-state actors, and the increased trend to multidimensional operations. Traditional peacekeeping based on the maintenance or observation of a ceasefire between consenting states, remains a valid UN peacekeeping task but, since ‘90s, there has been a remarkable increase in the requirement for integrated UN missions to conduct peacekeeping within states –in, rather contested environments. UN Security Council Mandates became more demanding as all functions of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building are now being recognized as increasingly overlapping.

Changes to traditional peacekeeping tasking have led to greater demands on mission leadership, requiring MLTs to be better prepared, resourced and accountable for their actions. Their composition will vary depending on the specific requirements of a mission: in current multidimensional PKOs, HoM and leader of MLT is usually the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The HoM is often supported by one or two Deputy SRSGs (DSRSG), one of whom is frequently designated as the Resident Coordinator (RC) and/or Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) of the UN agencies and programmes comprising of UN Country Team (UNCT). Multidimensional and integrated missions are likely to integrate various civilian and military components, heads of which will normally form the MLT (senior leaders include: Force Commander, Police Commissioner, Director/Chief of Mission Support and Mission’s Chief of Staff). Individual leadership qualities of MLT membership are of crucial importance, but can be optimized only if personalities interact with and complement each other. MLT needs to operate compatibly as an inclusive, coherent team in which members remain respectful of each other’s competencies and mandates.

Peacekeeping operations are implemented not only to restore and/or maintain security but also to re-establish public order, protect civilians, impose rule of law, and disarm, train, and integrate former conflicting parties into society and state structures. To carry out these missions,

53 Ibid
UN Security Council issues mandates sanctioning peacekeeping operations in response to crises or conflicts that threaten regional and/or international stability. Peacekeepers may be deployed as blue helmets under direct control of UN or part of a coalition or a unilateral command authorized by a UN Mandate -such as African Union-led forces in Somalia & NATO International Security Assistance Force/ ISAF in Afghanistan. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions represent opportunities for applying principles and mechanisms of a comprehensive approach55. In addition to deploying security forces, UN peacekeeping operations are legitimate international coordination mechanisms that enable a range of partners to contribute.

Practically, multidimensional peacekeeping furthers political, economic, and humanitarian development efforts by securing operational space in conflict zones and crisis situations. Security operations are generally coordinated through official bodies. However, ad hoc arrangements among PK forces and non-aligned humanitarian actors can be applied to facilitate support to local authorities, and authorize intervention in cases of acute humanitarian crisis, at tactical level. UN has not sanctioned comprehensive approach as doctrine, but that is not an important issue. However, multidimensional approach has already been defined by UN/SCR, as a coherent operational model that link comprehensive approach to peacekeeping operations. The emphasis placed on coordinated and sustainable solutions is related to comprehensive approach56. While UN endorses and actively seeks to implement a comprehensive approach to multidimensional peacekeeping, it is confronted with various operational issues that might further weaken other international organizations’ efforts (like NATO). Shifting loyalties, unclear security conditions, and absence of internal cohesion, constantly threatened mission effectiveness and credibility in current complex crises contexts.

In recent crises, traditional military command and control/C2 and leadership are being challenged. Senior officers understand that operations are only one component of a larger campaign with a range of participants including host -nation governments, external government agencies, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental and private sector actors. Since the military cannot impose leadership on these diverse though essential partners, leaders must incorporate how leadership can include coordination and consensus, trust and information- sharing, and any constraints towards integration. Integrated missions provide a

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means to operationalize the concept of a comprehensive approach. They are defined by common purpose and mutual awareness among various participants united and committed under a mandate. Such missions are characterized by cooperative spirit and coordinated lines of activity. Their structures are influenced by operational factors and a complex mixture of political, humanitarian, security, and development interests. In a similar manner, every mission requires unique capabilities tailored to meet the characteristics of operational space.

PK operations share the same operational space with humanitarian NGOs, UN specialized agencies, as well as private and public development agencies. Here, mission command and coordination mechanisms -not always explicit-, cannot be imposed, even when coordination mechanisms have been established: this is a real challenge in multidimensional peacekeeping. Military units are increasingly engaged in delivering humanitarian aid while NGOs are obliged to rely on military forces and resources to ensure operational effectiveness and the safety of target populations.

Humanitarian actors make a strong effort to balance the need for a coherent UN approach with the necessity for a neutral and impartial humanitarian action. In many cases, priorities between the military and humanitarian actors are in a high contrast. If, however, humanitarians interact with military units, there is a viable concern that their legitimacy and impartiality may be compromised. On the other hand, the militarization of foreign aid can have an unexpected security impact: effective coordination between PK forces and humanitarians can prevent serious mission overlaps, enhance situational awareness, and facilitate a coordinated military-led assistance operations.

The complexity of current conflicts demands flexible and adaptive responses. Increased demand for peacekeeping continues to put enormous pressures on national armed forces, military and defence planning, as well as on available recourse. These missions demand sophisticated situational awareness, professional discipline, tactical restraint and sufficient logistics support. Broadly approached, UN operations maintain an increasingly multifunctional character, where military leaders must consider additional specific tasks related to a wider military/ defence/security domain: humanitarian, developmental, social and political.

3.3. Military Leadership and Doctrinal Development

The role of the military in world affairs has been expanded: while many have predicted that the military’s role would be diminished after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it became more
active instead. Global War on Terrorism/GWT and a series of expeditionary operations around the globe, perfectly illustrate the usefulness of the military as a key element of national (and, international) power. Despite some high-tech aspects in recent armed conflicts, waging war continues to be an intensely human endeavour: streets, mountains and deserts require *boots on the ground* to achieve victory. As a result, the military relies on leaders (not managers, program directors, or project supervisors), to accomplish its primary mission. The military emphasizing the importance of leadership makes a great effort to develop leaders through formal education, training, operational assignments, and self-development. Officers are expected to spend years in military schools developing leader-competencies and leader-skills needed to reach next levels of leadership.

The military has been continually adapting to emerging political, societal, economic, and technology developments, challenges and threats. As a rule, leadership doctrine development supports transformation on the basis that *every member, regardless of rank or appointment, is a leader* and under the requirement, *to transform the strategic and operational management of forces, by maximising strategic leadership skills and embedding a deep understanding of a military leadership philosophy throughout AFs*\(^{57}\). If we accept that transformation is vital in meeting future challenges, then leadership is the key to transformation, as it transforms by design through influencing, directing, motivating, evaluating and achieving.

Doctrinal manuals, therefore, need to establish a military leadership framework incorporating all three (3) leadership levels: *strategic, operational and tactical*. They bring together existing leadership concepts by establishing leadership dimensions and showing how they are interrelated\(^{58}\). Such a framework represents a single instrument for leader development and a domain to debate and critically think about leadership, emotional intelligence and self-awareness. These demands require the military to maintain a range of capabilities and competences to meet current threats.

Military forces recognise three (3) levels where leadership doctrines apply: strategic, operational and tactical, which, in military context correspond to the levels of military operations (*in management theory: direct, organisational & strategic levels*)\(^{59}\). The recognition that leaders interact within and between these levels emphasizes the applicability of competencies from tactical, to operational, to strategic. Strategic leadership requires a broad supervising perspective towards tactical and operational levels. Strategic leaders prepare the

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\(^{58}\) *Ibid*, 2-2  
\(^{59}\) *Ibid*
organisation, communicate vision and anticipate future. In many cases, they operate in an uncertain environment where complex issues are affected by external factors and pressures.\textsuperscript{60}

Operational leadership drives the organisation, linking strategic and tactical levels, ensuring the implementation of strategy and objectives, while leaders, at the operational level, remain highly influential. This level is responsible for executing planning and implementing strategy, at operational and tactical levels.\textsuperscript{61} It can also serve as an additional channel between strategic and external influences on a unit/organisation level. Operational leadership competencies, though similar, differ from those at tactical level, in degree: operational leaders focus on medium-term planning. Through directly and regularly interacting with lower levels, they maintain an understanding of the realities of decision-making and implementation. While insisting that subordinate-development is essential, they assess how a commander's mission is understood.

Leadership at the tactical level promotes the direct application of leadership to achieve defined tasks in realising operational level objectives. Tactical leadership is face-to-face, first-line leadership, verifying that decisive operations still pits human against human.\textsuperscript{62} For tactical leaders, the challenge is to execute and achieve specific tasks by directly guiding subordinates, sub-units and/or units. Tactical leaders, in seeking to increase certainty and minimise complexity, motivate and develop subordinates through direct contacts. Here, the leader has a direct responsibility for maintaining unit culture and climate, cohesion and well-being. Character, then, describes essentially, who the leader is: personal values, attributes, character, and qualities. Additionally, competences are reflected in the skills and behaviours exhibited by the leader: knowledge (basic & expert), behaviour patterns. By combining them, both, present and future behaviour of a leader, can be determined.

Leadership is the most essential element of combat power and the human/moral component of military capability, as it provides for its delivery. Strategic leaders are required to manage multiple demands and oversee relations among different organisations. Strategic leaders are asked to offer expert military advice to governments and international organizations. To this end, they use Military Decision Making Process/MDMP, for decision-making,\textsuperscript{63} planning and achieving, while Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid
\textsuperscript{63} US Army/ Center for Army Lessons Learned, Military Decision-Making Process, Lessons and Best Practices (No 15-6, March 2015); US Government/ MoD- US Army ADRP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, August 2012.
Methodology/COPDM can also provide a common understanding of the principles, doctrines and approaches to operational planning and training. Here, context demands creativity and highly-functioning processes. Commanders and staffs must understand joint and combined procedures and campaign planning principles in dangerous and extreme contexts. Initiative and empowerment capacities are key to leading and execution. Leadership requires effective unit function in environments that can be chaotic. Good planning eliminates uncertainty. Then, a well-trained and -prepared organisation may achieve the mission even when things go wrong.

3.4. Military Command as an Authority

Military command is defined as,

"the military authority and responsibility of an officer to issue orders to subordinates, pertaining to the command vested in him or her, covering every aspect of military operations and administration" 64.

Command therefore is a state of authority where an individual is legally appointed and vested with important responsibilities. Commanders exercise authority over subordinates by virtue of appointment (positional power). Since that authority, derived from law and military regulations, cannot change, commanders must accept that this responsibility is not to be delegated, at any circumstances. Effective military leadership does not depend exclusively on command authority since it needs to be validated by subordinates through force of character and not simply by force of law: ‘...military commanders are not considered leaders until their position has been ratified in the hearts and minds of those they command.’ 65:

\[ \text{Power} = \text{Authority} + \text{Influence}. \]

Power is a combination of authority and influence. Command authority, the conferred part of a leader’s overall power, is founded on legal documents directly related to a post held. It is temporary. Leaders enhance their position, through increasing power by exerting positive influence on followers.

There are two types of power: positional power and personal power\(^\text{66}\). Positional power is the power related to command authority: individuals gain and lose positional power every

\(^{64}\) Republic of Ireland/ General Staff of the Defence Forces (2016), Op. Cit., 3-2

\(^{65}\) Ibid, 3-2

\(^{66}\) Ibid, 3-2
time when assuming or leaving commands, appointments or ranks. Personal power, on the other hand, is the power a person holds by virtue of personality, charisma or character. It can be gained through strong and extensive effort and learning and it can be maintained through performance, behaviour and conduct. In personal power, the capability to influence is central, since it is required to affect beliefs, values, attitudes, and performance.

3.5. Mission Command

Mission Command\(^{67}\), the leadership philosophy of defence forces, is a value-based and mission accomplishment-focused concept, aiming at improving an organisation. Mission command is a philosophy that promotes decentralised command, freedom and speed of action and initiative, however, it is responsive to superior direction, since it presupposes trust and empowering of leaders, at all levels. Here, mission command is the necessary structure that enables such a philosophy. Mission command requires a style of leadership that recognises five supporting elements: a) unity of effort, b) trust, c) mutual understanding, d) timely and effective decision-making and e) decentralized execution\(^{68}\). Mission command requires that:

- a) subordinates understand clearly the commander’s intent, their own missions, and the strategic, operational and tactical context
- b) subordinates understand what effect they are to achieve and the reason why it is necessary
- c) subordinates be given adequate resources and in turn allocate sufficient resources
- d) commanders exert appropriate control so as not to limit unnecessarily the subordinate’s freedom of action
- e) subordinates decide how best to achieve their missions, but must keep their commanders informed of their intentions and actions\(^{69}\).

This concept could be practiced in military training, in peacetime and combat contexts, and remains quite conditional to personalities and situations. Military personnel support the concept of mission command, as it facilitates the involvement of all personnel into leadership process.


\(^{69}\) *Ibid*, 3-2
4. THEORY

4.1. Leadership

Leadership\(^{70}\), one of the core fundamentals upon which the military functions, is debated whether is, in fact, an *art* or a *science*.\(^{71}\) As the academic world has progressed its thinking in many social and scientific disciplines in the last fifty years, so has the inquiry into the nature of leadership in a civilian and military domain. As a result of the development of thought, our understanding of leadership complexities in rapidly changing contexts has been broadened and enlightened. Since the ‘40s there have been five *generations* of theory while it is important to understand that none of the five ‘generations’ are mutually exclusive or totally time-bound. Effective and credible leadership in modern environments requires the traditional qualities of courage and confidence but also emotional intelligence and other relational skills. All significant trends in leadership theory reveal an evolving series of schools of thought from *Great Man* and *Trait* theories to transformational leadership. Whereas early theories tend to focus upon the characteristics and behaviours of successful leaders, later theories begin to consider the role of followers and the contextual nature of leadership.

**Great Man Theory:** First theories that developed were called Great Man theories because they focused on identifying any natural qualities and characteristics possessed by great social, political and military leaders -including men like Alexander the Great, Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma Gandhi and Napoleon. Thomas Carlyle’s *Great Man* theories (19\(^{th}\) c.) were *based on the belief that leaders are exceptional people, born with innate qualities, and destined to lead*\(^{72}\). It was simply an issue of *who* they were. It was a short step from the great man concept to the trait theory of leadership\(^{73}\). This orientation implied a belief that leaders are born and not made, are naturally great leaders, with a set of personal qualities. Even today, this belief remains valid.

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\(^{71}\) Max de Free. *Leadership is an Art*. (New York: Dell, 1989), 12


\(^{73}\) Ibid
Trait Theories: Trait approach arose from the Great Man theories as a way of identifying the key characteristics of successful leaders, thus, emphasizing that people were born with these traits. However, in the process, it became apparent that no consistent traits could be identified. The difficulty with trait approach is that it is not concerned with different contexts and does not focus on any definitive list of traits. Some of them, however, appear more frequently, including: technical skill, sociability, and self confidence, application to task, group task supportiveness, emotional control, determination, general charisma and intelligence. Trait approach provides a direction by identifying possible traits necessary for effective leadership.

Trait theory dominated the study of leadership from the late Victorian era until the middle of the twentieth century. It argued that some individuals, because of their personal traits, are born leaders. Trait approach was the first systematic attempt to study leadership and, more specifically, to study leaders, not followers -as it was assumed subordinates lacked any traits! Therefore, trait theory as an elitist concept of leadership, is based on the belief that, there is no hope for the rest of us not born with certain gifts or talents for leadership. Trait school has several strengths, like, strong appeal and faithful, but it makes a strong effort to indicate those (more) important traits! On the other, trait school does not satisfactorily address the context in which leadership is exercised. It does not appear willing to accept the widely shared understanding that, although a leader may be effective in one situation he may not be in another.

Behavioural Theories: Early researchers, after a strong emphasis on traits, started analyzing what leaders do, how they behave (especially towards followers), stressing on new concepts: task- behaviour and relationship -behaviour. Research, now, moves from leaders to leadership -dominant way of approaching leadership within organisations in ‘50s & ‘60s-, with attention shifting to behavioural theories. Overall concept here is based on a thesis that leadership strategies are influenced by a leader's assumptions about human construct and nature.

Contingency Theories: Contingency /situational theories were developed to indicate that the style to be used is contingent upon such factors as situation, people, task, organisation, and other environmental factors. Contingency approach rests on the capabilities of leaders to adapt and change according to situations –absolutely critical capability. Additionally, it argues that

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leadership effectiveness is a function of the interplay between a leader’s style and the leadership situation. Contingency theory argues that it is easy to change your leader in response to the situation\textsuperscript{78}: normally, this seems as a contradiction, as it creates images of a chaotic chain of command with no clear direction. In fact, this is closely related to the idea of niche-expertise with commanders using their situational judgement to call on expertise knowledge, while retaining overall responsibility. Indeed, some argue contingency theory is just common sense, an absolutely realistic acknowledgement that, eventually, individual leaders cannot be equally effective in all situations\textsuperscript{79}.

**Situation Leadership:** This theory follows the logic that different situations require different kinds of leadership\textsuperscript{80}. It is based on the premise that a leader will be required to apply leadership skills according to abilities and commitment level of subordinates, thus, taking a situational perspective of leadership\textsuperscript{81}. Key situational variable in determining appropriate leadership styles is the development of subordinates. Now, new theories start to recognise the importance of leaders’ -followers’ relationship, as well as an interdependency of roles: no longer hero or solo leader but, team leader\textsuperscript{82}. Both leader and follower can assume responsibilities and can become active participants in the leadership process.

Theory’s basic idea is that different situations require different leadership styles. This has its own strengths, however, it remains quite demanding, as it requires substantial intellectual and mental agility, good, balanced and fair judgment, versatility and sound emotional intelligence. Historically, the military has been extensively involved in situational leadership (tactical, operational and strategic level).

**Team Role Theory:** Here, the word *shape* indicates *shaper*, and the word *vision* implies *plant*\textsuperscript{83} Vision, certainly important to leadership, needs to be unique to an individual, while, also, may be *borrowed* by a *shaper* who adopts a solo leadership style. In a rapidly changing and uncertain environment, no person can hold all solutions and answers, while team leadership style permits a more holistic, participative, style of leadership where teamwork, problem-solving, decision-making and innovation can, all, emerge.


\textsuperscript{83} *Ibid*
Transaction and Transformational Theories\(^4\). Transactional theory is defined in terms of an exchange-based relationship between leaders and followers. This leadership style has its origins in the organisational / business domain and remains in a strong contrast with transformational which is concerned with how a leader adapts to the motives of followers, while inspiring them to reach full potential. Both are important. Transformational leadership is closer to the prototype of leadership, an ideal leadership, while it offers an ideal role-model with which subordinates would wish to identify.

Transformational leadership is concerned with human and emotional aspects of leadership:

“...the goal of transformational leadership is to ‘transform’ people and organisations in a literal sense - to change them in mind and heart; enlarge vision, insight, and understanding; clarify purposes; make behaviour congruent with beliefs, principles, or values; and bring about changes that are permanent, self-perpetuating, and momentum building.”\(^5\)

It gives emphasis on who is leading and who is being led. Here, leaders are required to inspire and communicate the idea of an exceptional achievement through personal development and hard-work. Transformational leadership is purely idealistic: it is concerned with inspiring, promoting transformation, generates commitment based on values, not explicit rewards\(^6\). It is an appealing concept common to inspirational leaders who set personal examples to motivate subordinates: an antidote to a cynical, materialist world. However, critics have labelled it, rather, naive, without clarity and, increasingly dependent upon non-tangible human traits (vision, motivation, inspiration, trust, altruism). Beyond this, it has become, during time, increasingly associated with charismatic leadership. Transforming leadership is a:

“...relationship of mutual stimulation and elevation that converts followers into leaders and may convert leaders into moral agents”....

“[transforming leadership] occurs when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality...”\(^7\)


\(^7\) Ibid
Dispersed Leadership. Referred to as informal, organic, emergent or dispersed leadership, this approach supports a less formalised model of leadership where a leader’s role is dissociated from the organisational hierarchy (formal organisational power roles). It distinguishes the exercise of leadership and the exercise of authority and emphasizes the development of leaderful organisations through concurrent, collective and compassionate leadership. Key, here, is the distinction between leader and leadership: leadership is regarded as a process of sense-making and direction-giving within a group, while leader can only be identified on the basis of his relationship with others within a certain team.

Emotional Leadership: leaders with high emotional maturity are considered more capable of maintaining co-operative relationships with subordinates, peers and superiors. Some components of this approach include self-awareness, measuring strengths and weaknesses, and self-improvement. Self-understanding is critical to effectiveness across the spectrum of challenges encountered by a leader, while self-awareness is considered as the heart of emotional intelligence.

Path-Goal Theories: Systematically examine the relationship between leaders and followers and investigates how leaders motivate subordinates to accomplish objectives. This approach, by emphasizing subordinates/ followers centrality to leadership, brought new perspectives in theory and research. It implies that leadership should not be enforced on subordinates but it is exercised in conjunction with them, recognising that leadership cannot be imposed on those led. It contains four categories: a) directive leadership is involved in over command, identifying and allocating tasks, indicating ways to be implemented, setting standards and deadlines. It is a style of leadership familiar to most leaders and

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commanders, perceived as the most appropriate type of it. b) supportive leadership suggests leaders should create harmonized working conditions, and remain mindful of subordinates needs. c) participative leadership where leaders engage their staff in the decision-making process by inviting opinions and facilitating the emergence of a problem-solving culture. Marshal Rokossovskiy of the Red Army commented as follows:

‘...believe an old soldier: there is nothing a man prizes more than the realization that he is trusted, believed, relied upon...’

\[94\]

d) achievement-orientated leadership: leaders with high standards and expectations demand systematic and strong, continuous effort, for improvement. Such leaders, rather than being tyrannical and authoritarian, demonstrate confidence in their subordinates and stress that excellence needs a long time-frame to emerge. Rokossovskiy, again, commented:

‘...insistence on the highest standards is an important and essential trait for any leader...but it is equally essential for him to combine an iron will with tactfulness, respect for subordinates and the ability to rely on their intelligence and initiative...’

\[95\]

Emergent/New Leadership: Term is referring to recent leadership theories which may be categorised as, post-heroic and servant-leadership theories (including level-5 leadership, distributed leadership, and leaderless groups). These approaches reject inclusive and collective forms of leadership, where the role of a leader is to achieve communal goals. It requires the leader to know when to step back and emphasises the need for him to be a good follower too. In addition, it highlights the need to have social skills and a capacity to work effectively with others in teams. Servant Leadership emphasises leaders’ duty to serve followers. Leadership then arises out of a desire to serve rather than a desire to lead. Characteristics of servant leaders are as follows:

‘...servant-leadership is a practical philosophy which supports people who choose to serve first, and then lead as a way of expanding service to individuals and institutions...servant-leaders may or may not hold formal leadership positions...servant-leadership encourages collaboration, trust, foresight, listening, and the ethical use of power and empowerment...’

\[96\]
The complex dynamics of 21st century environment require leaders to be flexible, situation-aware and understand systems and individuals they operate and interact with. There is an inherent responsibility on all leaders to honestly reflect on and share knowledge gained through experience and education, to ensure effective leadership in the future.

4.2. Crisis Management

4.2.1. Challenges

Challenges of approaching crisis management are mainly produced by the limits of knowledge related to the field itself. These are, often, structured at three (3) levels:

a) **conceptual challenge** reflected in the difficulty of reaching a consensus on the very definition of the concept of a crisis and the theoretical challenge reflected in the coexistence of multiple theories that may be sources of confusion

b) **practical challenge** resulting from the difficulty of delineating the skills required at various phases of a crisis and of managers other than senior managers

c) **reflective challenge** related to the lack of knowledge with respect to the actors’ behaviors, emotions, and decisions in the period immediately preceding the crisis (stand-by) and in the immediate aftermath (learning).

In relation to the first challenge, scholars remain convinced that most of crisis concept definitions tend to reject its original meaning, which combines, in fact, both, effects (*threat, danger, fear, confusion*) and positive (*opportunity, change, new state of affairs*). In greek etymology, crisis emphasizes a momentum where most critical element, decision-making occurs. During time, however, we have witnessed many cases in which ‘avoiding decision or non-decision’ have been the main characteristic, instead. This recent practice, rather, does not, actually, verify that very frequently-quoted axiom, *crisis is both, an opportunity and a threat*, stressing that, potentially, threat (*and, damage!* should be the expected outcome of a crisis, rather than any real opportunities (*generated by crises!*). Concerning the second, scholars and researchers show confusion and anxiety when approaching this field of study, discovering that it is, a priori, not-organized, not-defined and not-integrated. Too many definitions, views and scientific approaches, raise questions and confusion. A wide series of theories, on the other, make a strong effort to become applicable to every situation, context, and domain. Objective,

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here, should be forming theories, distinct, issue-specific, however, complementary, which emphasize, clearly, main strengths and limitations and contribute to the enhancement of crisis management knowledge. In the third, currently, a considerable part of available literature on crisis management focuses on the aspect of leadership during crisis situations (crisis leadership): though this concept is essential, it focuses primarily on plans and procedures to deal with unexpected and not-anticipated events and situations. However, by design, crises cannot be managed with plans. Recently, there has been a trend for more crisis leadership than crisis management which has led to confusion and greater difficulties in approaching conceptually this term.

Crisis management is an ambiguous conceptualized term, as it actually combines two apparently opposing terms: management and crisis. On the one hand, management involves clear and proper anticipation and planning, providing guidance, and help to control a crisis and, on the other, crisis is unique, exceptional, and, a priori, impossible to design plans or management procedures and rules. In theory, crises cannot be managed. So, can crisis management be taught? Are there any real gains in learning to manage crises if these are unique? Any knowledge captured, would become, de facto, cancelled. In addition, in most crisis management case-studies, assessment is conducted after process has been concluded, thus, in terms of training and learning, it does not, in fact, offer any real knowledge about wider context’s functions that generated them. Another negative factor in crisis management research is the existence of many different theories on this field which complicate the task of conceptualization. In the field of crisis management there are plenty of definitions, approaches and multiple theories and this characteristic could, 'reflect the complexity of modern world, which requires many answers, sometimes even contradictory ones, echoing the principle of “requisite variety”.

Crisis management theories include: a) the planning school b) the school of organizational contingencies or the sociology of catastrophes c) the configuration school

d) the school of organizational learning\(^{102}\)  
e) the school of situated cognition\(^{103}\)  
f) normal accident theory\(^{104}\)  
g) the “high reliability organizations” model\(^{105}\)  
h) the theory of postmodern risk\(^{106}\).

### 4.2.2. Concepts and Processes

As crises have become an integral element of life, this concept consequently, has increased the interest for understanding crises and made organizations understand and adapt to sudden changes that may occurs. This evolution, in fact, facilitated the emergence of what has been labelled, crisis management: ‘‘. importance of the crisis management discipline as a way to reduce the negative spillovers of the crisis and an art to create a permanent custom to live with crisis...’’.\(^{107}\)

All, multiple definitions of crisis management,\(^{108}\) related theories, techniques and (scientific) methods, aim to explore crisis environment, according to its characteristics, examine advantages, coordinate stakeholders involved, and prevent escalation. In this context, crisis management is defined as a ‘setup and a systematic method to understand appropriately the crisis and to know how to take advantage of it’.\(^{109}\) Crisis –management represents a combined approach of various theoretical, scientific and administrative methods aiming to ‘create a power to predict the future occurring of it’\(^{110}\). It is an inter-disciplinary field, combining, economics,
Another critical function in crisis management process emphasises monitoring internal and external contextual factors that might generate a crisis, as well as mobilizing all necessary resources and means to effectively respond, manage and confine it. Based on this prevailing crisis management paradigm, involvement in a crisis situation is based on an overall goal, to ‘achieve the least possible damage to the organization and its members’\textsuperscript{111}.

Several advantages of crisis management process could be mentioned, however, some considered as most important\textsuperscript{112}: a) \textit{Simplification of procedures and the avoidance of complexity}: to get away from all that would complicate matters and create confusion, lack of understanding and clarity. This procedure develops systems and enacts laws that facilitate the management process. b) \textit{Coordination}: coordination between crisis management and other organizational departments is an important requirement in order to implement decisions and to prevent contradictory actions and behaviors. c) \textit{Planning}: crisis management denotes a general framework in which leaders will be able to manage tasks when surrounded by a crisis. This paradigm holds a scientific methodology making leaders capable for introducing improvisation and quantitative methods in decision-making. d) \textit{Continued presence}: dealing with a crisis requires a continuous presence and oversight of management team to exchange views and observe the development of the crisis. It offers an opportunity to take appropriate and timely decisions and gain effective control over current and future crisis environment. e) \textit{Delegation of authority}: it is a basic condition during crisis-processing. It provides capabilities to take appropriate decisions quickly without delays. Delegating authority (power to act/respond) could reduce levels of confusion, mis-coordination and anxiety. For effectively managing a crisis, prerequisites are: diagnosis of crisis origins; identification of crisis management process; reduction of potential negative spillovers; examination of all available alternatives. Effective planning and crisis management processes, as a continuum, can contribute to minimize surprise, and facilitate organization’s recovery, quickly and at a minimum damage.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid, 96.
4.2.3. Stages and Methods

Based on crisis conceptualization, crisis management process is developed through a series of especially critical stages which can be summarized as follows\textsuperscript{113}: a) Stage of warning signals discovery: the discovery of early danger signals of a crisis occurring, as crises usually send signals long before its burst, while such symptoms strengthen prediction b) Preparedness and prevention stage: this stage extends risk -prevention methods from discovery phase. Prevention includes the discovery of strengths and weaknesses in order to locate crisis’ impact. This gives the organization sufficient methods for crisis- prevention c) Containment of the damage and the reduction phase: it remains not possible to prevent crises from happening. By this sense, this stage of crisis- management process aims at preparing means that could limit damage and prevent its spread to other parts d) The stage of the activity restoration: this includes preparation and implementation of short and long-term programs e) The stage of learning: it is about education and re-evaluation in order to improve what has been achieved in the past (lessons- learned). Education and learning are critical, however, they can be very painful as memories are recalled. This stage enables to draw lessons from crises and depends on the willingness to sacrifice and the desire to change and improve –here, learning should not mean mutual accusations. f) Evaluation of the crisis: after the conclusion of a crisis, time is devoted for recognizing and assessing success, effectiveness and failures. Furthermore, evaluation indicates the extent to which the organization was affected and possible reputation damage (fame) levels.

Here, an important methodological distinction should be made between traditional and non -traditional methods in crisis -management. In the first category\textsuperscript{114}: a) Denial of the crisis: this method used often under authoritarian regimes or commands, refuses to recognize the existence of any imperfections in the administrative entity. It is also a media- blackout practice on a crisis, with a complete denial of its occurrence, and a demonstration of a fully capable administration to counter any crisis b) Inhibition of the crisis: this stage indicates the postponement of the crisis appearance: this means engaging means to directly dealing with a crisis and destroy it. c) Extinguishing the crisis: this stage represents an extremely violent method based on the clash with public authority regardless of human values. d) An understatement of the crisis: the underestimating of the crisis (impact and outcomes) creates positive and strong feelings to confront any hard effects of a crisis e) Vent the crisis: method

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, 27.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid
called vent of the volcano where manager resorts to vent the pressure inside the volcano in an attempt to reduce the boiling rage and prevent the explosion. j) Unloading the crisis: according to this method, this stage aims to define alternatives and multiple choices as solutions to a crisis.

j) The isolation of the crisis forces: crisis manager monitors and determines the dynamics of a crisis in order to isolate it from the course of crisis itself.

Furthermore, it is a necessary condition to adapt crisis management methods to the specific context in which a crisis evolves and proceeds. This evolution has extended research and led to a new body of methods labelled as, non-traditional methods of crisis management. These methods are: a) team method: one of the most frequently used methods so far, a common tool in different disciplines. This diversity shows clearly the factors that are behind the emergence of a crisis. By exploiting rationally team members’ abilities and skills it can be feasible to circumvent negative effects and consequences (current or future) of a crisis b) tactical method: this method is concerned with technical procedures that enable managers to reduce crisis impact.

These technicalities influence fundamentally the operational processes of the organization c) democratic participation method: it is based on transparent considerations and open dialogue as a means to resolving (or, confining) a crisis. It perfectly mirrors the interaction between leaders and subordinates to approach benefits and interests of the organization. It resembles to a brain-storming method d) containment method: this method aims at surrounding and restricting a crisis in a narrow space. Adopts dialogue and deliberation as a method to bridge different parties involved e) escalation method: used when a crisis is not clear enough, in a sense that crisis factors are combined (not distinct). j) fragmentation method: it is probably the most ideal method since each crisis has its own identity. The tactic of this method is to demolish the identity of a crisis which, in turn, will automatically cease to exist.

115 Ibid, 28
5. LEADERSHIP IN DANGEROUS AND EXTREME ENVIRONMENTS

5.1. Context

Current global security environment, increasingly unpredictable, demands greater agility, innovation, and collaboration\textsuperscript{116}. Therefore, the military, to further enhance current leader- generation process and grow next generation, must adopt new training and education frameworks, and reform promotion and assignment mechanisms (career development). It is necessary to focus on more diverse sets of leadership traits and skills, and facilitate novel paradigms on leadership. Rapid global changes in technology, economy, as well as significant social and political developments, have all led to increased levels of complexity which require leaders to remain aware of these trends in order to prove effective in combat. Military doctrinal manuals \textit{per se} do not seem sufficient to support leaders in overcoming current and future war complexities. As Clausewitz\textsuperscript{117} described it, there is an internal (human, personal) trait which must be cultivated to further develop next leader generation, that of genius. This set of qualifications represents inherent (charismatic or transformational) leader capabilities necessary to overcome combat uncertainties and re-think those assumptions upon which planning and implementation of military operations (war and MOOTW) are based. In MOOTW, critical factor is decentralized environment where small-unit leaders now operate, respond, act and make decisions. Current military operations are quite centralized -political- strategic level-, however, specific tactical/operational circumstances have created an unusually decentralized execution (command) domain. This has, in turn, generated a clear and strong demand for an increased dependence upon junior officers (and NCO's), in an unprecedented way. This is true, as, very often, junior leaders need to operate independently from higher units, and, thus, become obliged to make timely decisions without consulting senior leadership. Therefore, MOOTW leadership capabilities, competencies and, mainly critical decision-making skills should be incorporated in junior leaders' leadership education and training programmes.

Based on Clausewitz’ remark that, in war, the end -result is \textit{never} final, it can be argued that the new era of global terror, gray zone conflicts and PKOs will continue to preserve the sentiment that ambiguity and uncertainty will also be defining next conflict generation. It is common that, at strategic level, not-clear guidance and direction rule routine planning:

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Ibid}, 10-15
translating strategic documents into a clear understanding of the operating environment is a process deeply rooted in the mind of strategic, tactical and operational planners. Currently, it is common for military leaders to plan on a blank sheet, a reality that, actually, represents the unique character of contexts in which military forces operate today: unknown and extreme. To develop such traits, they need to focus, beyond and above all, on leader-development. It is true that, very often in the armed forces, organizational inactivity may restrict or cancel creative and innovative thinking, and transformation: in professional (traditional) military education, the maxim, “we won’t teach you what to think, we’ll teach you how to think”, should prevail.

However, in reality, additional efforts in education and training are needed to challenge and motivate leaders on thinking beyond textbooks and enhancing learning, rather, than focusing, merely, on mission success (strictly defined)! This, in fact, represents a prime opportunity for those engaged in next generation military education structures and processes to start revising current leaders’ training methods. Professional military education should stress that current combat environment does not, any longer, require pure textbook–solutions. Task of (future) military leaders is to remain in control at any time and, when faced with ambiguous environments, be prepared to show strong responsive capabilities, thoughtful action and effectiveness. Through accepting new standards in training, education and leadership-development, armed forces could benefit from those, potentially, innovative leaders prepared to invent new solutions to old issues. Then, the military, through a creation of a new leadership paradigm, will effectively counter ambiguity and uncertainty, dominant parameters in next generation (extreme context) combat.

5.2. Leadership Challenges

Emphasizing the constant interaction where context influences leadership, it can be argued that effects are greater when context becomes more extreme or dangerous\textsuperscript{118}. Due to social and organizational complexities involved, leadership research, even under favourable circumstances, seems a difficult task, while, in dangerous contexts, is probably considered impossible. However, this type of research in environments where leadership matters most’ is absolutely essential in understanding those indispensable functions effective leadership provides. This type of research seems equally essential in generating (new) theories, ideas, and

techniques to facilitate the development of leaders capable of operating in dangerous contexts while managing any leadership challenges such environments might impose. Both, empirical and theoretical research on military leadership in dangerous environments, does not seem sufficient: *dangerous environments are defined as those in which leaders and/or their subordinates are personally faced with highly dynamic and unpredictable situations and where outcomes of leadership may result in severe physical or psychological injury to unit members.* Such environments can be encountered in war, combat and operations other than war/ MOOTW (e.g., PKOs or HAOs), but they are also encountered in LEOs, S&ROs, and, occasionally, in intense training operations. Then, the military is unexpectedly forced to engage in a dangerous context.

In approaching, conceptually, definitions on effective leadership in dangerous contexts, the critical task is to, empirically, assess whether the specific nature of a *(dangerous)* context requires leadership to be applied in a differentiated manner *(corresponding to a specific context).* Leadership is important in extreme contexts—regardless of any individual and/or team skills and competences possessed. Such an approach would, undoubtedly, facilitate a strengthening of team dynamics and leadership effectiveness, however, it is not easy to, empirically, verify and explain it.

**5.3. Military Leadership In Extremis**

Demand for crisis leadership arises when a situation that threatens high priority goals, suddenly occurs leaving limited response-time. Both internal and external factors *(organization and environment)* must be considered when determining contexts. The manner in which individuals actually make sense in uncertain environments is considered today as a function of the military decision-making process.

In extremis situations present unique demands on leaders because they can produce highly unstable conditions, threats and danger for all involved. In extremis leadership is defined as giving purpose, motivation and direction in high stress situations when, there is imminent physical danger and where followers believe that leader behavior will influence their
survival\textsuperscript{123}. Under stress, individuals have a tendency to demonstrate practises already-learned, however, as current military environment seems highly ambiguous and not-predictable than it used to be, the military cannot, easily, sustain standard training for all situations, contexts and conditions\textsuperscript{124}. Dangerous situations are intolerant of protracted learning\textsuperscript{125}, thus, further research on leader competences is required in order to clarify types of in extremis environment. It, then, seems logical that in in extremis contexts a differentiated, specific style of leadership should be applied as extreme events might affect leader and his subordinates. However, and, despite increased interest, conducting empirical research in a dangerous environment, is still difficult and questionable.

Leading in in extremis situations, remains one of the least addressed areas of leadership research\textsuperscript{126}. Not much is known about how leaders understand context and processes in these dangerous environments, communicate with team members, and superiors, make rational and thoughtful decisions (\textit{while, considering all potential consequences}), in accomplishing missions assigned. Because most of the literature on in extremis is based on theory, empirical evidence-if feasible-would be highly useful. This assumption has implications for theory and practice since crisis leadership is currently a highly-valued quality for leadership competency. In several cases combat leaders encounter stress, uncertainty, and pressure, thus, dynamics of in extremis situations normally lead to questions: is there anything we can do to better prepare leaders to assume this tremendous burden, through a better understanding of in extremis environment? Most importantly, can studying leadership as experienced by combat veterans advance the understanding of both in extremis leadership and leadership in general? Objective, here is to expand understanding of complex dynamics of in extremis environments: in an increasingly unstable world, leaders’ behaviour and functions in in extremis situations are essential to the military.

Past studies had concentrated on leadership and team-dynamics in dangerous (military) environments, reduction of ambiguity during in extremis contexts and development of a detailed framework to explore in extremis contexts. Additionally, sufficient field/empirical leadership and lessons-learned, were used. These studies had facilitated the definition of in extremis contexts while serving as a foundation for future research. In extremis leadership is

\textsuperscript{124} D. Dixon, ‘Staying Alive: The Experience of in extremis leadership,’ (PhD Thesis, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, May, 2014), 1
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Ibid}, 6-8
recognized as relevant since perceptions of organizational danger and emotional responses can be similar in these contexts: crisis management is considered a strategic competency for many commanders/leaders. It has been argued that research on leadership in dangerous conditions is nearly impossible. As a result, in extremis leadership remains one of the least addressed areas of leadership research. Most of the empirical work on this subject focus on leaders’ view on the environment, ethical behaviour and, self-control & assertiveness, however, findings are not clear. Main purpose is to bridge these gaps by exploring leaders’ sense-making and sense-giving to followers in order to navigate in extremis situations and survive. Investigating sense-making and sense-giving processes, in crises, can render situational awareness an integral part of this overall process.

Here, we need to explore in extremis environment and understand how leaders rationally understand these contexts (sense-making), as well as how they transmit sense during threatening contingencies to their subordinates (sense-giving). Main purpose is to examine in extremis leadership from those who had lived and survived it, thus, enhancing not only military literature, but also a broader managerial leadership knowledge. We need to assess military leaders with very strong (and, preferably) recent extreme context experiences, to gather knowledge on senses and responses to crises. In many organizational contexts, leaders need to execute quick decisions, show strength and control, share resources and, make hard compromises to minimize potential damage.

Leadership in extremis cannot be examined by employing heroic leader as an example, alone. It requires a wider understanding of the actual process through which leaders and followers perceive, experience and make sense of an in extremis context. Since leadership context is often used to explain leader responses and behaviour, then studying in extremis context can significantly contribute to sense-making and sense-giving.

In extremis leadership research employs two primary methods for viewing context. One view is that context per se defines a situation as in extremis: if a leader is in a dangerous situation, facing, simply, physical danger, then leader is viewed in in extremis situation. In a complex context view, however, perception of danger becomes necessary: followers, sensing to be at the point of death develop an increased awareness that leader behavior will influence their survival. In these conditions, critical is not context, alone, but, also, context -perception by those involved. There are cases, where followers may perceive the situation as in extremis, while leader himself might not consider it dangerous because of his expertise. In a certain context, danger perceptions and actual danger are not- similar among individuals because of
their differentiated levels of expertise, knowledge and training. Leadership research connects literature, stressing that, both, context and danger perception create an in extremis situation, thus, making context debate richer.

**In extremis** leadership is not solely perceived as negative: rigorous military training enhances a willingness to be *tested* in battle, while recent studies stress a satisfaction of leading or operating in an extreme environment. Importantly, historical memoirs report positive combat experiences that greatly resemble the phenomenon of *flow*, which may explain why some soldiers are drawn to the danger and excitement of leading in a war zone.

5.4. Theory

The study of military sense-making has addressed this concept with reference to planning and command & control/ C2, military training, and trust. This research makes both sense-making and sense-giving critical in a military environment. In extremis situations often require collective understanding on how a leader makes sense of this context, but also how that sense is shared, transmitted and communicated to team members. In exploring what constitutes leadership in threatening contexts, it should be emphasized that researchers rely on *physical and social sciences*, offering a methodology on sense-making analysis of leadership in dangerous circumstances: ‘...[grounded theory], attempts to explore how leaders make sense in extremis environments.’

Individuals when found engaged in the middle of a situation, they need to understand the environment, shape and react to it. They need to understand and evaluate its identities. Sense-making is recognized as a function of the military decision-making process when the military is faced with dynamic and uncertain environments. It allows individuals and organizations to approach and transform complex situations, by downgrading them into something they could possibly comprehend (*events and/or information*). Then they are prepared to take necessary action. This is what military commanders always wish to do. Military sense-making studies have addressed sense-making with respect to planning and command and control, military training, and trust among military members. Both leader sense-making and sense-giving are most important in every military environment.

Initially, the concept sense-giving was defined as ‘*a process of attempting to influence the sense-making and meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of*...

organizational reality... Sense-giving functions as a reconstruction of sense-making. Sense-giving extends sense-making: as an integrated process, sense-making is related to understanding while sense-giving to influencing and persuading. In an in extremis military context, sense-giving needs to be implemented quickly to prevent mis-perceptions and miscommunication, as those could prove deadly in an in extremis situation. Research supports that in dangerous contexts, sense-making and sense-giving are emerging simultaneously.

In extreme contexts, individuals need to make sense of a certain situation before proceed to logical action, thus, sense-making is transformed into the means through which experience is understood and applied through careful consideration. Researchers debate on the, unintended consequences and the limits of practical consciousness and examine the interaction of action and thought. Sense-making analysis provides explanations concerning military leaders’ intentions about action to be taken in those situations. During sense-making process in military command teams, commanders need to limit their staffs to be more effectively participate in sense-making process. Commanders lead both staff officers, who convert missions into plans and orders, and sub-commanders who translate plans into operations. Here, two different types of command teams could be proposed: a) horizontal and b) vertical. The former is horizontal command team -members are commander’s advisors-, and the latter is vertical command team -comprises two hierarchical levels.

Although much has been written about situation awareness/ SA, it still remains a controversial term. SA is mainly concerned with human factors, referring to those levels of awareness and understanding individuals express over a situation, thus representing a dynamic understanding of what is going on. Main debate concerning this theory is whether SA is described as a cognitive process -used to develop and maintain SA-, a tangible outcome of SA, or a combination of both processes used as the end product of SA. In other approaches, it is described as the process of:

“...combining of new information with existing knowledge in working memory and the development of a composite picture of the situation along with projections of future status and subsequent decisions as to appropriate courses of

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131 Ibid, 408
action to take” or as ‘externally directed consciousness’,... suggesting SA is... the invariant in the agent-environment system that generates the momentary knowledge and behaviour required to attain the goals specified by an arbiter of performance in the environment.” 132.

Early SA theories have focused on describing SA on an individual operators’ perspective, while current models in the literature are individual- based theories: a) information processing-based three-level model b) perceptual cycle model and c) theory of activity model. 133

Situation awareness is a fundamental requirement process for managing crises. It rests upon knowledge and prediction (while sense-making is about how an individual arrives at an outcome). It is concerned with knowledge levels an individual possesses over a situation and his actual capacity to use it. Thus, it remains an important component of sense-making and sense-giving, intervening in the decision-making process. As such, situational awareness perceives the environment, synthesizes them, extracts information and integrates available knowledge.

Sense-making in command and control/ C2 is considered as the process of arriving at an understanding of a certain situation in terms of how to proceed and it is a central task in military decision making 134.

”...sense-making is the essential link to information and decision superiority, but remains a weak link in the C2 value chain.” 135

Despite its obvious importance, it has received little attention within the context of military decision-making. Sense-making is not situation-assessment and sense is not situation-awareness. Situation-assessment and situation-awareness should not be viewed as parts of the sense-making process, as this represents a different cognitive process. Situation awareness refers to the levels of accurate knowledge an individual (or a team) has on a given situation and his capability to predict. On the other hand, situation assessment assumes a known situation for which the outcome of the assessment can be compared to the true situation,136 while a sense arrived at might have little in common with any true situation, as there is simply no way of knowing what the true situation is, except by acting on the basis of the sense that has been

132 Ibid
133 Ibid
135 Ibid, 1
136 Ibid
achieved. In reality, there is no possibility to assess if present views on a situation are wholly correct, thus, the evaluation of sense-making should focus on the quality of this process and its outcomes. In command and control/C2, objective is managing while accomplishing a mission: different missions would make commanders and staffs focus on different aspects of a situation, and, thus, make different sense of it.

Members of military staffs arrive at differentiated views on potential solutions to a situation (individual sense), depending on functions and perspectives. But, sense-making is never a truly individual activity: information is exchanged, and individual staff members are being influenced. Staff creates and elaborates a shared sense. Commander represents a special type of an individual, as he is that person who ultimately decides on the course of action, and thus defines any sense attributed to the situation (commander’s sense)\textsuperscript{137}.

Sense-making analysis rests on the key characteristics in distinguishing dangerous from conventional contexts: dangerous environments are rich in events that are inherently ambiguous, uncertain, and unexpected\textsuperscript{138}. Leadership, as a collective sense-making process, among team members, is applied to reduce environment’s negative characteristics.

Team members adjust processes, maintain situation-awareness, and remain prepared, flexible, and willing to reconsider, reassess, and change tactics as the situation evolves. Here, a unique perspective on the actual leading in dangerous environments is being offered: leadership is a truly collective undertaking (similar to shared leadership perspective),\textsuperscript{139} while influence moves among team members as they develop a common understanding of the situation.

Context has an impact on leadership depending on specific environment’s characteristics and leadership approaches. In dangerous contexts, focus is on potential interactions, characteristics and behaviours among danger, leader, and followers, as well as on leadership process per se. Do dangerous environments demand a different kind of leadership or different leader characteristics and traits? Are there any preferences over leader behaviors? Do they create unique leader and team interactions? How does danger actually impact leadership process?\textsuperscript{140} Here, research need to underline the crucial function of trust when leading in dangerous environments—an important leadership requirement in sense-making approach. Trust, an essential combat capability, is being developed over time, through testing: leaders develop it through a process but, in extreme contexts, trust can be developed relatively rapidly.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{137} Ibid
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Donald J. Campbell, et all (2010), S5.
  \item \textsuperscript{139} Ibid, S5 -6
  \item \textsuperscript{140} Ibid, S6-7
\end{itemize}
This confirms the fact that, in specific, high-risk conflict contexts, environment encourages the rapid development of trust among unit members, in executing complicated, interdependent combat missions.

In a combat environment, trust is also a central factor in defining leadership characteristics, such as the development of mateship\textsuperscript{141} (creation of close, supportive relationships based on expectations of loyalty and stoicism). This term appears to protect combatants from intense psychological stress of extreme environment and reassures team members that unit cohesion is ensured. Mateship creates trust and loyalty and provides psychological and emotional protection, necessary to maintain the ability to lead in dangerous conditions. Successful leadership in extreme and dangerous contexts typically requires successful experience in similar conditions. Such experience could build self-confidence and create strong self-efficacy beliefs which will lead to higher leader-performance levels. Leader self-efficacy has been consistently reported as an important parameter promoting leader effectiveness across contexts.

Obvious ethical difficulties on the experimental study of leading in dangerous contexts can pose obstacles: by relying on strong behavioral theories, research can still focus on ethical considerations, as well as on leaders’ ethical choices. Leaders' actions in a morally-sensitive context can enhance trust among followers, increase leader influence, and sensitise followers on ethical issues - facilitating ethical decision-making. Consequently, the issue is whether followers can trust their leaders to do the right thing in extreme environments or, whether they trust their leaders to serve as an ethical role-model in this context?

In the military, members must trust ethical superiority of those chosen to lead in combat contexts. Then, ethical behaviour - vital component of leadership in dangerous contexts - is being ensured through procedural mechanisms. However, it is leader's own moral integrity which will, ultimately, determine choices made in hostile and threatening environments. Ethical behavior can be influenced by certain leadership styles, at least in such contexts, thus, verifying the link between transformational leadership and moral development.

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid, S8
5.5. Effective Leadership in a Dangerous Context

Scholars address those factors influencing effectiveness across individual, dyadic and team levels. More specifically, they suggest that leadership effectiveness, in dangerous environments, can be enhanced by:

- a) shared and compatible mental models on all levels
- b) leader creativity
- c) leader affect management on both individual and dyadic levels
- d) the creation of cohesiveness and positive team climate and
- e) successful performance

Effectiveness can also be obstructed by:

- a) work overload at the individual level
- b) stress at individual and dyadic levels
- c) conflict on dyadic and team levels

All these underline the importance of the usefulness of building cohesion and positive team environment. This applies especially on those qualities that impact on leader-performance in dangerous contexts, shadow aspects: stress in dangerous environments is likely to weaken leadership effectiveness, while remains a major shadow aspect in a combat context.

Additionally, other shadow aspects affecting effective leadership, like the potential emergence of a violence culture (violations of legal and ethical standards during war-conduct) and corruption (power-abuse and post), could, also, be added. On the other, a series of bright competencies/qualities enhancing leader effectiveness could be cited: physical courage; comfortability with risk; willingness to lead by example; prior experience in dangerous contexts; expertise. Examining recent (international) military operations, it can be concluded that leader-performance and leader-competence perceptions by subordinates, remain crucial in trust assessment, in dangerous military environments. These findings are broadly consistent with theory and field/empirical research concerning the importance of knowledge in sense-making and the value of leader's past combat experience.

5.6. Leaders in Dangerous Contexts: Challenges and Vulnerabilities

'...Decisions!..., a commander in chief who has not got the quality of decision, then he is no good...'. (Bernard Montgomery).

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142 Ibid, S11
143 Ibid
144 Ibid, S12.
145 Ibid.
What distinguishes military leadership from general leadership is not leadership itself but the context, in which military leaders operate. It is often referred to as dangerous or extreme, being defined as follows:

“...highly dynamic and unpredictable environments where leaders and group members must routinely engage in actions that place their physical and psychological well-being at risk to accomplish the organization’s objectives...in such situations, leaders and subordinates recognize that failure to perform their duties and accomplish the organization’s objectives has the potential for catastrophic consequences not only for their organization, but also for the people it serves...”

Concerning leadership demands, it can be argued that leaders in dangerous contexts must handle four (4) contextual dimensions: a) location in time: the content of successful leadership can vary over the stages of preparation, response and recovery during an extreme situation, and leaders must manage shifts b) magnitude and probability of consequences: in order context to be considered as extreme, individuals must perceive the consequences of a threat to be feasible c) proximity: a leader’s impact on subordinates may vary depending on the physical distance between them and the leader’s need to balance proximity to subordinates and d) form of threat: different threats (physical, psychological, or material) trigger different reactions (post-traumatic stress, mortality salience, self-esteem-based responses) which in turn require different leadership responses.

What distinguishes leading in dangerous contexts from leading in other contexts is the combination of unique psychological, social and organizational demands that occur as an outcome of organization members’ threat perceptions. Psychological demands include leader’s trustworthiness and character (mental integrity) which are necessary to manage team members’ engagement and survival. Social demands refer to those qualities in leader-follower relationship which demonstrates extended psychological closeness and high degree of cooperation. As long as organizational demands are concerned, dangerous contexts require

149 M. Fors Brandebo, ‘Military Leaders and Trust,’ Dissertation, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences- Department of Social and Psychological Studies, Karlstad University, 2015, 14.
organizations and teams to build a strong culture basis and collective identity, and unite efforts to accomplish specific objectives and vision.

In dangerous contexts, organizational core values are found to be: a) service b) courage c) duty d) integrity and e) honour.\textsuperscript{150} In modern multinational military operations, six (6) primary factors causing stress have been identified as such: a) isolation (separation from families) b) ambiguity (e.g. unclear mission, confusion in the command structure) c) powerlessness (restrictions due to security and operational concerns) d) boredom (alienation), e) danger (threat), and f) workload.\textsuperscript{151} Although we tend to emphasize strain, danger and ambiguity, in military contexts, it is important not to overlook the effect boredom (lack of real interests-absence of real concern) could have on military personnel serving in multinational operations. As military operations can imply long periods of no significant (not- interesting) task to perform, lack of constructive tasks and inactivity could lead to higher stress-levels and increase leaders’ demands to maintain team morale and motivation.\textsuperscript{152}

As leadership in extreme environments depends on trust and loyalty, subordinates become more vulnerable and keen to scrutinize leaders. Trust, however, is not negotiable in extreme contexts. If necessary trust-levels do not exist, this context can render subordinates mute against an insufficient leader.\textsuperscript{153} Here, leaders are to be seen as more effective if they can provide initiative qualities and show prompt and decisive action.\textsuperscript{154} Leaders need to be flexible and capable of adapting to rapidly-changing contexts. Attention on the external situation could prove positive, during an intense response phase. Leaders, based on transformational leadership principles, can remain inspired as leading from the front, while encouraging subordinates -as part of the mission.\textsuperscript{155} Dangerous contexts are characterized by dynamic and unpredictable environments where leaders and subordinates need to perceive a specific context as highly-threatening and -risky. However, all remain committed to achieving organizational goals and aware of that any failure may damage the organization and its members. Leaders in dangerous contexts must be able, anytime, to adjust behaviour according to situations, balance, distribute and control authority, and manage stress reactions.

In contexts associated with high risk and vulnerabilities, subordinates evaluate leader’s ability and integrity, as these can affect the accomplishment of their tasks. The trustee (person
to be trusted) is judged on three factors: *a) individual characteristics for being perceived as confident, calm or responsible b) task competence for being able to manage his/her position and (c) competence in battle for being perceived as able to handle a dangerous and risky situation*\(^\text{156}\). This knowledge further verifies that trust is context-specific: negative elements in the involvement of armed forces in *high-risk multinational* combat environments could explain the emphasis on combat competences as important leader-trust development factor.

5.7. **Trust in a Military Context**

Trust in a military context is to a great extent characterized by risks and vulnerability. During multinational military operations, members of the military involved develop and share a collective identity and common values, and remain committed to mission objectives. Trust and contextual characteristics (*culture, climate, and processes*) interact, while the old axiom that external threats can increase cohesion seems to be applicable in these contexts. Increased risks and threats positively affect trust-development, amongst leaders and subordinates, as well as within units, especially, when operating in foreign, and unknown environments. Strain can be caused by involvement in a crisis context, however, this may become magnified due to insufficient trust-levels between leaders and subordinates. In critical situations, low trust in a leader could lead to subordinates developing and expressing negative emotions. Trust levels can affect risk-taking perceptions, decision-making process, individual-team responses and task-accomplishment, during involvement in negative critical incidents.

Acting has a positive effect on trust-development, however, strong trust-levels may have a negative impact on risk-taking, as unit members may respond carelessly and incautiously in a risky environment. Strong trust could press military personnel to deviate from standard behaviour patterns based on routine education and training and rational thinking. In fact, trust could, to a certain extent, lead to a deviation from deeply-learned actions and repeated behaviours. Individuals involved in extreme contexts, may dismiss potential danger, because of high trust levels towards others’ actions: when individuals keep acting as there is no danger, others will probably trust their judgment without true consideration. In a high-risk military operation, consequences can prove severe if unit members act illogically due to stress-line of thinking consistent with *dark sides of trust*).

Leaders operating in dangerous contexts remain relied upon trust, as the main psychological mechanism to provide subordinates with a sense of safety, security and certainty, which allow them to assume the risk of following leaders. Another trust’s function is that it determines the level of influence leaders exercise, and creates links among unit members. Lack of trust in a leader, in military contexts can make subordinates follow leader’s directions, advices and orders, however, reluctantly and doubtfully. Trust in military leaders requires strong competences and abilities, and, to this point, military trust research has suggested ten (10) attributes of leaders who can be trusted in combat:

a) competence b) loyalty c) honesty/ good integrity d) leading by example e) self- control (stress-management) f) confidence g) courage h) information sharing i) personal connection with subordinates, and j) sense of duty.\textsuperscript{157}

Additionally, a broad definition of competence could prove useful, including: a) job knowledge b) intelligence c) decision- making d) management e) interpersonal skills.\textsuperscript{158}

In current military operational contexts, trust has acquired multiple meanings. Studies indicate that most soldiers reconsider trust in their leaders prior to combat, because of a lack of understanding leader’s competence, and prior combat experience.


\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
5.8. Extreme Context vs Crisis Situations

Most leadership research on extreme situations or extreme contexts, have been conducted in combat and military (operational) environments. Thus, most of the data analyzed was collected and processed, rather, in a simulated environment, than in real extreme or dangerous situations. Studies use different leadership styles and focus on predicting unit performance during crises. There is no agreed view concerning which leadership style is the most effective and influencing on unit members’ performance, in a dynamic and unpredictable context. In the available literature, military combat situations are perceived as extreme or dangerous (situations), and military leadership is typically approached accordingly. In principle, there are signs supporting the existence of similarities between leadership in extreme situations, leadership in dangerous situations and leadership in crisis (situations) [crisis leadership]. Clear distinctions, so far, have not been feasible.

Crisis is defined as a major unpredictable event that threatens to damage an organization, like the military, while characteristics that distinguish a crisis from an extreme event could be the following:

“...in extreme situations, a) the threat should reach the threshold of intolerable magnitude, whereas in a crisis, the threat is a high-priority goal
b) leadership should have a long preparation time, but can still remain extemporaneous when the situation evolves c) low probability is a characteristic...”

While in crises threat is perceived as a high priority goal, such threats must reach the threshold of ‘intolerable magnitude where goals do not constitute high priority but an imperative. Crises as defined produce reactive responses, but organizations operating in extreme contexts can in fact have predicted or even controlled the origins of an extreme event -this can offer a significant preparation period. While definitions of a crisis consider these situations to be of low probability, extreme events that characterize extreme contexts are not necessarily so. Extreme contexts are not necessarily characterized by ambiguity concerning cause, effect, time, and means of resolution. Crisis and extreme contexts are not synonymous: we do recognize that the two can be entrained such that a crisis leads to an extreme context or vice versa.

160 Ibid
161 Ibid, 900.
6. CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP IN CRISSES

6.1. Charisma

'Beware charisma! But to beware does not necessarily mean "avoid!"
(Hodgkinson, 1983).

Leaders have been viewed as charismatic because of their success and/or because they have expressed a vision. Analysts distinguish crisis-induced charismatic leaders from visionary (charismatic leaders). Former may be classified as leaders based on their actions, but, who remain not capable of transforming charisma into a visionary one. Charismatic leaders is an added value for their organizations, they have a positive impact on followers which, eventually, are translated into a collective effectiveness for organizational/ unit members, above and beyond typical call of duty. Thus, charismatic leadership is considered as a form of effective leadership, a mixture of most streams of leadership research. According to theory, charismatic leadership may be attributed to a person (in terms of actions and/or behaviors) as well as to a situation encountered by the leader in a sense that charisma becomes induced. As visionary charismsatics tend to connect leader actions with values, they elicit follower behavior-consistent with followers' values.

Crisis-induced charismatic leaders, on the other, tend to connect leader action with solutions and seek consistency between follower behavior and concerns: followers perceive a leader as charismatic, only after an effective and successful engagement in a crisis. Theory argues that visionary charisma may persist over time, while crisis-induced charisma should fade once a crisis has passed. Thus, it comes natural to question whether charisma exists in crises, in non-crisis situations or in both. More specifically, examining the role of both types of charismatic leadership we could, additionally, question whether these types actually exist?

It is critical to consider that in distinguishing between these two different types of charismatic leadership, objective is to add further value to leadership theory and research. Organizations consider it absolutely desirable to focus on those desirable effects or bright side of charisma. During crises, they would prefer leaders who can demonstrate a positive impact.

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163 Ibid
164 Ibid, 2.
165 Ibid, 3.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid, 4.
on followers and add an effective task-performance to successfully engage and manage. Leaders under these circumstances need to be skilful at detecting problems (crises), in order to influence followers' perceptions and successfully seek needed outcomes from organization/team members.168 Visionary charismatic leadership is also important to organizational performance, success and survivor. Organizations tend to place emphasis on leaders who are visionary, and commit increased resources to educate/train leaders in visionary behaviour-development. Such an investment would benefit organizations by enhancing performance levels and trust.

The concept of charisma169 can be defined in terms of leader traits or personal characteristics coupled with situational/contextual factors. Firstly introduced, as a phenomenon in organizational theory, in a form of authority: authority based on charismatic grounds is separate and distinct from other traditional (i.e., inherited) and rational-legal (i.e., rule-based) forms. Charismatic leader was approached as an ideal, model person, possessing divine grace and mystical gifts, someone who sets the example. Operating and behaving beyond tradition, he reveals a transcendent mission or course of action which may be appealing to potential followers, but which is acted on because the followers believe their leader is extraordinarily gifted.170 Charismatic leaders are expected to emerge during crises, as organizations associated with charismatic authority have been structured upon a built-in instability.171 Scholars, however, remain negative on accepting crisis as a requirement for charisma, and insist on viewing it from a broader context-linked with transformational leadership. Political scientists and sociologists view charismatic leaders as change agents, persons with essentially differentiated views and beliefs. They can be, furthermore, labelled as, pure or charismatic-like. Charismatic leadership may, thus, be situational in that crises facilitate the emergence of a leader while leader behaviour is conditioned upon followers' perceptions of charisma.

6.2. Vision in Charismatic Leadership

Focusing on the different components of charismatic leadership, elements of vision and crisis become crucial. Central theme in this debate is the notion of a vision (or, critical mission) as an integral part of charismatic leadership172: the first requirement for charismatic leadership.
is a common or shared vision of what the future could be\textsuperscript{173}. The existence of vision does not necessarily render a leader charismatic in terms of personality, behavior, or effects on followers. Individuals may possess a vision, but fail to demonstrate other attributes, typically associated with charismatic leadership - furthermore, distinguishing between non-charismatic and charismatic types of vision. Charisma represents an important dimension of transformational leadership which allows transformational leaders to define a vision and communicate it among team members.

In discussing transformational leadership, it is stressed that leaders must have a vision (\textit{or overall goal}) to bring change. Sharing a radical message (\textit{on a vision}) to subordinates is a pre-condition for charisma. A radical mission (\textit{operation / battle}) may take the form of a vision on behalf of the leader. Leader’s vision, as a key component of behavioral theory on charismatic leadership, is not consistent with status quo, in any manner. Though carefully-formed to stimulate charisma, through organizational culture, vision and outcome are linked. In visionary leadership, the creation of a vision is expected to empower followers into action. In emphasizing vision main focus is on personal (\textit{visionary}) characteristics and behaviour of charismatic leaders, while emphasizing visionary leadership charisma is approached as an effect of leader behaviour: this notion of empowerment is critical in distinguishing crisis-induced charismatic leader from visionary (\textit{charismatic leader}).

Charisma is approached as a result of effective leadership. Thinking in terms of organizations’ future, visionary leaders are committed to change culture, using appropriate cognitive skills and implementing vision. Concerning personal behavior, leaders ‘...focus attention on the vision, communicate it, establish trust among followers, develop self-respect and take risk.’\textsuperscript{174} When a leader is engaged in such behaviours, he is perceived as charismatic by subordinates. As vision creates and reinforces organizational culture, leaders, by engaging in charismatic behaviours, create and reinforce shared beliefs which define culture. This is critical as culture, in fact, connects leader vision with organizational outcomes: when visionary leaders use power to construct organizational culture, culture, in turn, empowers vision per se.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid, 30-31
6.3. Toxic Leadership

Organizations at strategic, operational and tactical levels can be severely damaged by toxic leaders\textsuperscript{175}; those who show destructive behavior and demonstrate signs of dysfunctional personal characteristics. It is a negative leadership style to organizations and its members, manifested through destroying enthusiasm, and cancelling creativity and innovative thinking. Toxic leaders are those commanders who put their own needs first, micro-manage subordinates and display weak decision-making competences. Toxic or bad leaders\textsuperscript{176}, an anathema to unit health, are defined as those who tend to abuse power in order to serve, mainly, personal objectives -normally, inconsistent with organizational. Toxic leaders may be classified super-toxics (demonstrate mistrust to all), career- toxics (hate and mistrust peer, superior and subordinates, only), and sub-toxics (latent /hybrid characteristics)\textsuperscript{177}. They tend to function through over-controlling, as they view leadership as constantly being in control. They rely on self-confidence and enthusiasm to climb hierarchy and over-exaggerate personal attributes. They manage to develop all necessary personal expertise on order to evaluate context as well as those they can best manipulate and control. They remain ambitious, show no restraint, retain strong abilities to charm superiors, and build quick alliances to control organization’s function\textsuperscript{178}.

While charismatic leaders are an added value for an organization\textsuperscript{179}, toxic leaders view themselves as charismatic without having any real personal charisma: military officers may become charismatic (leaders) by creating a unique image and an exaggerated (false) reputation to inspire and motivate subordinates. To satisfy individualist or professional ends, they may extend boundaries of law, behavior, or ethics.

6.4. Leadership and Heroism

Leadership and heroism are different concepts. Leaders and followers are caught up in a dynamic relationship. There is an implicit contract between leaders and individuals / groups, and when this breaks, relationship may decline. However, there is no actual relationship or

\textsuperscript{175} Colonel John E. Box. *Toxic Leadership in the Military Profession*. (USAWC, Strategy Research Project, 2012), 1-6

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid, 14.
contract between heroes and those who perceive such individuals to be heroic; the opposite of a leader is a follower - direct and complementary relationship -, and the opposite of a hero is a coward - independent relation. There can be four (4) possible combinations of a leader/ hero relationship: a) an individual can be neither a leader nor a hero b) an individual can be a leader but not a hero c) an individual can be a hero but not a leader and d) an individual can be both a leader and a hero\(^{180}\). Not all leaders are heroes, and not all heroes are leaders: a leader can lead without acting heroically (or be perceived as a hero), and a person may be heroic without ever leading. In fact, leaders are not expected to be heroes, or heroes to be leaders. Leaders are rarely heroes, and heroes are rarely leaders\(^{181}\). Heroism is generally approached and analysed through the lens of, potentially, assuming great personal risk (and/or loss-damage). Risks are probable and sacrifice may be expected, however, risks of failed leadership cannot be effectively absorbed\(^{182}\).

**6.5. Heroic Leadership and Risk-Taking**

Heroic leaders assume personal risk and, when leading, they demonstrate a clear willingness to do so. When they assume risk, they share it while protecting others who might be exposed to risks. They are typical risk- sharers and risk- absorbers (beyond, risk-takers, risk- creators, and risk- observers). When others realize the commitment of heroic leaders to share or absorb risk, they become keen on taking and assuming risk for others.\(^{183}\) Heroic leaders are involved for themselves and for others. They find satisfaction in leading, achieving objectives, as well as sharing, assuming and absorbing risk. In that sense, motivating and empowering others is a natural consequence or, a requirement of leading heroically. Any gains are to be distributed and shared. They assume risk, but they often do not calculate carefully: they basically act in accordance with strongly- held personal principles and values and not with rational or mathematical calculation. Heroic leaders are prepared to assume a wide range of risks (low, moderate or high) and, thus, remain unpredictable. However, those who engage exclusively in low risk tasks and/or actions, are not expected to be perceived as heroic, although


\(^{181}\) Ibid.

\(^{182}\) Ibid.

\(^{183}\) Ibid.
capacity to function as an effective leader is less probable if they function exclusively at a high-risk level! ¹⁸⁴

Heroic leaders do not take high-risk for excitement or to attract attention, but, only when necessary, or when important principles and values are at stake. However, in the dark-side ¹⁸⁵ part of charismatic leadership, leaders exert a tremendous degree of influence over others so that they can lead a unit or an organization to destruction. While heroic leaders assume and absorb risk (for others), dark-side (charismatic leaders) generate increased risks (for them). History is full of too many examples of this type of leadership! Risk-creation can result in significant costs, damage, loss and destruction for all, with no concern for the consequences ¹⁸⁶.

Heroic leaders do not compete with team-members and, normally, they do not wish to manipulate them. They do not view actions as an opportunity for verifying their values, as these are taken for granted! In approaching crises and conflicts they seek a win-win, rather than a, win-lose outcome, thus, emphasizing on mutual needs and interests of all involved (status-quo maintenance). Since they view their organizations as unique teams with identical ultimate objectives, heroic leaders feel that a potential weak link within the organization will weaken the entire team (and, themselves). ¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, 9-10.
¹⁸⁵ Ibid, 11.
¹⁸⁶ Ibid
¹⁸⁷ Ibid, 9-10.
7. CRISIS LEADERSHIP

7.1. Crisis Management and Crisis Leadership

Though there is much research conducted on crisis management, only a limited part has focused on crisis leadership. Managing a crisis and exercising leadership during a crisis, do not coincide, although both deal with different views of the same situation. Crisis management relates, mainly, with operational issues, while crisis leadership deals principally with ‘how leaders handle human responses to a crisis, including their own’\(^{188}\): the core of crisis leadership refers to behavioural responses (personalized views, needs and emotions). Key requirements of crisis leadership include effective communication, clarity of vision and commitment to values. However, very few militaries can demonstrate achievements on crisis leadership planning, training, research and experience. Training for and experience of leading in high-stress situations can provide officers with flexibility, decision-making capability and deep appreciation for effective team-work. Nothing can actually test a leader like a crisis, as critical elements of leader’s deep character are to be revealed during dangerous and extreme events\(^ {189}\). Crises can, also, easily reveal leader’s strengths and weaknesses, and demonstrate competencies in responding and functioning effectively. Crisis leadership describes the framework through which leaders can actually cope with human sides of a crisis. This is done by examining the use of all available tools and techniques to effectively manage emotions, behaviours, and attitudes of those involved in this process. In approaching crises, it should be emphasized that military’s single peacetime task of combat preparation and training represents the de facto ultimate crisis situation as it involves life and death\(^ {190}\).

A major element in (traditional) military education and training focuses on teaching soldiers how to deal with a range of emotions they are expected to experience before, during and after combat. These emotions include horror, apprehension, grief, rage, revenge, loneliness, sadness, repulsion, vigilance, anguish, and guilt. Military leaders, fully aware of this, are expected to control them, otherwise team members will not be able to effectively perform in the battlefield. Combat leaders learn to deal with their own emotions and their soldiers’ as well. Crisis can provoke a high degree of chaos and confusion into an organization, while such high-stress situations can easily push rationality beyond sense and reason. Similar emotions

\(^{188}\) G. Klann. Crisis leadership: Using military lessons, organizational experiences, and the power of influence to lessen the impact of chaos on the people you lead. (Center for Creative Leadership: CCL Press, 2003), Preface.

\(^{189}\) Ibid, Introduction

\(^{190}\) Ibid
concerning crisis situations could include fear, anger, anxiety, sorrow, surprise, shock, disgust, love and desire for revenge. These can produce positive or negative consequences, as individuals, during crises, can respond with compassion, self-sacrifice, and courage, or can demonstrate selfishness, cowardice and greed. Here, the possibilities for irrational behaviour remain high: prior defective behaviour can easily worsen during crises, while those emotionally impacted by this situation, will not be able to accomplish even simplest tasks. It is in this chaotic, ambiguous, and dangerous context, in which leaders must lead (effectively!), otherwise, crisis can become an emotional chaos.  

Though not sufficient, it remains crucial for leaders to work on a well-elaborated strategic plan in times of crises, uncertainty and instability. They need to demonstrate strengths, and a map of the future, someone who can make hard issues seem simple. But what does actually constitute effective crisis leadership? Literature offers a wide range of suggestions, models, approaches and anecdotal evidence, one of which focuses on three key axioms of crisis leadership:

"a) stay engaged and lead from the front b) point to the big picture and communicate the vision c) seek wise counsel and use your team."

Furthermore, key competences to crisis leadership can include:

"a) maintain absolute integrity b) know your stuff c) declare your expectations d) show uncommon commitment e) expect positive results f) take care of your people g) put duty before self and h) get out in front."

However, needs to be emphasized that most crises cannot be avoided: crisis governance, though not an ideal management tool, is often the only available means to be applied, not to identify why crises occur, but to demonstrate the effectiveness of leadership to handle them.

7.2. Crisis in Charismatic Leadership

Visionary is one of the two types of charismatic leadership, then, the element of vision appears to be crucial in the conceptualization of this type of leadership. However, apart from

191 Ibid, Chapter 1.
192 Carol A. McBryde, ‘Connecting Fear, leadership, and Charisma,’ Association of Leadership Educations Annual Conference, Wilmington, Nc, 2005, 5.
193 Ibid
194 Ibid
vision, another, equally, crucial contextual component with a particular role, should be
discussed: crisis - a situation threatening high priority goals, occurring suddenly with little
response time available. In spite of a strong focus on crisis as a prerequisite for charismatic
leadership, scholars still disagree on crisis being defined as a prerequisite for charisma. This is
because leaders (or individuals) are viewed as separate from the context and, therefore,
charisma is originated from a person and not a context. Although crisis is *neither a necessary
nor a sufficient cause of charismatic leadership*\(^{195}\), there is an agreement over the fact that crisis
can be favourable to the emergence of charismatic leaders. Theory accepts the role of
short-term nature crises, some reject labelling crisis-produced leadership as charismatic:
perceptions of charisma are restricted to crisis situations, while laboratory experiments prove
that charismatic leaders’ effects on followers remain unrelated to a crisis situation. Crisis,
declared as a time when organizational goals are being challenged and established order is
abolished, is considered a necessary condition for charisma and a facilitator of charismatic
leader emergence. Scholars, frequently imply that leaders might create stress (*inherent crisis
element*), as an opportunity to be viewed as charismatic! For charismatic leadership, then to
occur, necessary conditions are crisis and solution - through management\(^{196}\).

Crisis, danger and uncertainty can facilitate the emergence of charismatic leadership as
they create a sense of anguish and despair to followers who tend to grant charisma to a leader
who is empathetic to their needs. To explain the effects of charismatic leaders on followers,
during crises, science proves quite helpful: when faced with crises, followers grant their leader
magic powers. Both, ethical and unethical charismatic leaders can equally impact followers
during crises\(^ {197}\): in the case of unethical charismatics, leaders use crises as a medium to
strengthen power, thus, leading followers to lose self-confidence. On the other, ethical
charismatic leaders aim at enhancing followers' self-respect and self-confidence, as crisis
intensifies their willingness to do the right thing. The existence of a crisis can weaken followers'
self- efficacy, which in turn may lead them to bond with a charismatic leader. Because of its
temporary nature, it is argued that charisma fades once a crisis has passed, a theoretical
hypothesis sufficiently supported be empirical evidence\(^ {198}\).

\(^ {197}\) *Ibid.*, 38.
\(^ {198}\) *Ibid.*, 40.
Charisma is the critical outcome of a crisis and leader’s vision (*in dealing with a crisis*): while both aspects are important (*for a leader to be perceived as charismatic*), crisis seems to have taken a head over vision. Whether there is a difference between crisis-induced and non-crisis-induced charismatic leaders has not been sufficiently examined. Theory, to bridge existing gap, allows charisma to be attributed to both, individual and situation in a sense that leaders interact with crises. Therefore, we can distinguish visionary charismatic leader from crisis-induced charismatic:

*visionary leader first justifies his behavior and then takes action*\(^{199}\)

In this case, followers' behaviour is related to their values as visionary leader connects values with action and, thus, is perceived as charismatic. In crises, where links between behavior and outcomes remain strong, crisis-induced charismatic leader -as opposed to visionary- restores this linkage and applies a sense of control on followers:

*crisis-induced leader takes action and then action is justified*\(^{200}\).

Followers, in this case, tend to follow leader as they believe that he best knows to solve a critical issue. Their response towards leader is based upon an assessment of leader’s capacity to guide crisis- management. In the case of crisis-induced leader, a different type of vision applies: followers' perceptions of leader's vision are *restricted* to the management/resolution of a crisis. Crisis-induced leaders differ from visionary (*non-crisis context*), concerning responses, as they are expected to demonstrate a crisis-management capability and, thus, ultimately, realize a vision.

Theory does not explicitly separate charisma from crisis situation. The role of crisis is now clear, while relevant research supports the crisis component of charisma. The issue of vision versus crisis -their role in charismatic leadership- is considered important. There is a tendency, however, in literature, to emphasize only one of these two aspects. Although we focus on vision instead of charisma per se, we, in fact, acknowledge the possibility that vision and crisis are not mutually exclusive: in times of uncertainty (*emerging of a crisis*), organizations need urgently visionary leaders, thus, it can be argued that, *just as crisis may lead to vision, so may vision offer a solution to crisis*\(^{201}\). Is vision or crisis, more important? Can both co-exist in charismatic

\(^{199}\) *Ibid*, 42.

\(^{200}\) *Ibid*, 43.

\(^{201}\) *Ibid*, 46.
leadership? In identifying charismatic leaders, is it person alone -the vision component- or person interacting with context -the crisis component- more important?

8. ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING IN TIMES OF CRISSES

8.1. Ethics in Crises

Ethical decision is defined as a decision in which all stakeholders have been granted intrinsic value by the decision-maker\(^{202}\). There are some advantages in this definition:

\begin{itemize}
  \item a) when it is extremely difficult to get consensus on specific outcomes required by ethics, it is easier to get consensus on process....there will be controversy here as well, but it is more manageable
  \item b) ethics principles, codes, and training cannot anticipate most, and certainly cannot anticipate all, ethical questions....they can, however, provide processes for ethical decision making
  \item c) it is easier to monitor and sanction processes than it is to evaluate the ethics of the resulting decisions\(^{203}\).
\end{itemize}

Such a definition of ethical decision-making is practical and defensible. In an organization, four (4) requirements for moral rule-making could be suggested:

\begin{itemize}
  \item ‘a) consider the interests of all the affected stakeholders in any decision made
  \item b) get input from all the affected stakeholders
  \item c) the interests of one stakeholder [should not always] take priority and
  \item d) establish procedures to insure that relations among the stakeholders are governed by rules of justice’\(^{204}\).
\end{itemize}

A decision, to be truly ethical, must take into account the interests of all parties possibly affected by that decision. A moral leader, therefore, remains committed to engage in a fair, open and transparent dialogue with all stakeholders, to obtain genuine consensus. However, when a certain situation does not allow for an actual dialogue, moral leaders will feel obliged to ensure that everything is taken into due consideration\(^{205}\). Typically, not all stakeholder claims can be satisfied, while all decisions need to be justified by the decision-maker. In case not all stakeholders are explicitly considered, then, a decision is, by definition, not ethical. This ethics-analysis framework in crisis decision-making is based upon certain parameters, such as, the


\[^{203}\] Ibid.

\[^{204}\] Ibid, 333

\[^{205}\] Ibid, 334
actual crisis and its characteristics, organizational and individual stress caused, and its effects on ethical and unethical decision-making.

In crises, individuals’ cognitive abilities become limited and access to stakeholders is reduced, due to time-frame limits. Fewer sources of information/data are available to decision-makers, thus, de facto, decision-makers’ manoeuvre abilities are reduced. Stress can be considered as the mechanism by which crises affect decision makers’ capacity. Stress is increased in various ways by crises, as, by definition, crises are characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity. As the survival of an organization may be perceived to be in jeopardy during crises, strong pressures will emerge. During crises, decision-makers may feel they have little or no control over the situation, a consequence that can lead to reduced responsibility and, probably, not ethical decisions. The primary psychological effect of crises is the creation of stress and anxiety to individuals: ‘the more unfamiliar the event, the greater will be the requirement for adaptation and change to cope with the event, and thus, the greater the level of stress generated’. 206

8.2. Application of Ethics Theories to Military Leadership

There is a gap between ethical questions leaders are confronted with and the types of answers to be given. When military necessity proves insufficient and rules fail, leader’s actions depend ultimately on personal style, integrity, and training. Thus, it is important to develop officers of character to understand what a good officer is about, beyond following rules and performing duties -although these are also important for an individual to be perceived ethical. Leaders need to approach ethics, but, in real life officers have no time or no inclination to develop a virtuous character, for themselves and their subordinates. This is magnified, in current circumstances, as even early-career officers are faced with ethical dilemmas when engaged in multinational operations and crises response operations. Perhaps, at later career stages it would be too late to develop proper character in ethical decision-making.

Theory presupposes that military leaders should be of a character, obliged to take decisions for them and their units when exposed to dangerous and extreme situations. Leader is prepared to ignore danger when making decisions in order to reach an effective outcome. Naturally, there is a conflict between duties: ethics prevail and leader's decisions will largely be dictated by the strength of his character. At higher command ranks, however, tensions can

206 Ibid, 336.
be identified in relation to ethical behaviour: non-ethical use of authority caused by the authoritarian character of the military profession.

Leader’s (senior) rank provides authority and power to exercise (increased) responsibilities as assigned by virtue of a post held, while at lower levels, command entails a certain degree of responsibility associated with it. When authority is used to fulfil responsibility, it is used legitimately and ethically, if not, it is used illegitimately and unethically -negligence being, also, unethical!
9. TEACHING CRISIS LEADERSHIP

9.1. Skills and Competences

Recent empirical studies have identified three (3) main demands, in times of crises:

- Calm but strong leadership
- Pragmatic decision making under severe times and resources constraints,
- Coordination and reorganization

Accordingly, these demands could facilitate the development of a series of crisis leadership competencies:

- Self-confidence
- Willingness to assume responsibility
- Motivating and articulating vision and mission
- Resilience
- Communication skills
- Decision making
- Analytic skills
- Decisiveness
- Flexibility
- Delegating
- Operations planning
- Team building
- Networking
- Partnering
- Social skills

Literature is rather vague and unclear in defining concepts, tasks, skills, and competencies, viewing them rather as interchangeable, doubtful and, maybe, even, confusing. This can be, partially, explained as these terms are to be applied in different domains, and levels. On the other, it can be argued that crisis leadership skills would apply anyway regardless of:

- Personal style of each actor
- Specific contingencies of various crisis situations
- Emotions raised in the context of a crisis

An additional limitation in literature on crisis leadership is that most proposed typologies are focusing on the upper management level, in large organizations, with no explanation on their potential applicability to tactical/operational levels (leaders – managers – commanders).

Decision-making under pressure (a skill often cited in effective crisis management literature), can be of no significance, as this process is inherent in any socio-political context, functioning within the broader context of groupthink. Moreover, possession of this skill is typically originated in an individual’s own character, knowledge and experience. Current approaches to teaching crisis management stresses the proper description of tasks or skills

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208 Ibid

209 Ibid, 28

210 Ibid
required at various phases of the development of a crisis. Thus, in analyzing crisis leadership, five (5) critical tasks for decision-makers, to accomplish, can be identified:

\[ a) \text{ sense-making at the incubation phase} \quad b) \text{ decision-making} \quad c) \text{ meaning-making at the onset} \quad d) \text{ terminating, and} \quad e) \text{ learning in the aftermath of a crisis}^{211}. \]

9.2. Crisis Management Simulation Exercises

A number of researchers have shown an increased interest in simulation exercises as a pedagogical approach for testing crisis management skills. Indeed, to handle practical challenges, and test necessary crisis management skills, simulation exercises seem a relevant and useful tool. By design, simulation exercises allow students to integrate theory and practice as they learn experientially in realistic circumstances and enhance awareness of responding in stressful situations\(^{212}\). Though demanding, are most effective since they stimulate intense emotions (surprise, uncertainty). Such a learning process may prove not-easy for students and instructors: classroom environment should be friendly and familiar to students, while instructors need to be supportive towards motivating and achieving objectives. Research in crisis leadership concludes that crisis management simulation exercises aim at the development of situational awareness, at three (3) levels:

\[ a) \text{ perception of critical elements in the environment (environmental monitoring)} \quad b) \text{ selection of meaningful activities as salient goals, and} \quad c) \text{ keen understanding of switching from one goal to another}^{213}. \]

Possession of these skills depends, typically, on instructors’ ability to provide quality feedback, effectively master debriefing, clarify and obey learning goals and objectives. However, there exists a difficulty in teaching crisis management through simulation exercises: as they are often designed by emergency and disaster experts, students need to demonstrate an understanding of standard operating procedures/ SOPs and routine orders already defined in emergency management plans. Thus, this type of exercises is not easily adaptable and applicable to those organizations, where, beyond pre-described routine learning, procedures and plans, to manage a crisis requires an acquisition of specific expert knowledge combined

\[ ^{211} \text{Ibid.} \text{, 29.} \]
\[ ^{212} \text{Ibid.} \text{, 31.} \]
\[ ^{213} \text{Ibid.} \]
with skills and competences, such as flexibility, negotiation, and communication -the military?\textsuperscript{214} Furthermore, skills employed during these simulations may not be, automatically, transferable from one organization to another. Scholars tend to distinguish between simulation exercises in a classroom and in the field (\textit{Table- Top Exercises & Real Exercises}): both, in their own way, as learning models, reinforce team-work, develop a common understanding, share knowledge and experience, and handle practical challenges\textsuperscript{215}.

\section*{9.3. Goals and Objectives}

\textit{Crisis leadership} has become a highly-reputed leadership competency for many organizations. In teaching \textit{crisis leadership} as a military management education topic, it is necessary to emphasize Army leaders’ experience, -personal and organizational- examples and case-studies from critical military combats. These will become the necessary tools to increase \textit{crisis context-awareness}, utilize experiences and enhance necessary competences. Additionally, this is a significant technique, linking pedagogy to \textit{crisis and leadership theory}, in a learning environment. A framework based on \textit{military, combat, experiences}, could provide guidance on teaching crisis leadership. This, ultimately, will explain crisis leadership function in complex, dynamic, and unexpected situations; analyse operational environment; define key crisis concepts’ utility in supporting leaders navigate safely during crises. Such a framework would explain how \textit{crisis leadership}, as experienced by frontline Army officers, can be linked to general management education topics. Military commanders and leaders working in unstable and hostile combat contexts can teach important lessons about crisis leadership\textsuperscript{216}.

There are three (3) main goals in teaching crisis leadership:

\begin{enumerate}
  \item improve awareness of the factors that constitute a crisis
  \item explain various experiences associated with a crisis
  \item illustrate how leaders learn to navigate a crisis\textsuperscript{217}
\end{enumerate}

As such, pedagogy focuses on crisis experiences and competencies associated with crisis management before developing any specific necessary skills and competences.

\textsuperscript{214} \textit{Ibid.}, 32
\textsuperscript{216} D. Christopher Kayes, Col. Nate Allen, and Nate Self, 'Integrating Learning, Leadership, and Crisis in Management Education: Lessons from Army Officers in Iraq and Afghanistan,' \textit{Journal of Management Education} 37(2); 2012, 181.
\textsuperscript{217} \textit{Ibid.}
9.4. Learning Framework

Three waves of research can facilitate clarifying those roles leaders will be asked to play in a crisis:218

a) Normal Accident Theory (NAT): 219 Defines crisis from a systems perspective as a normal part of operating in a complex, dynamic, and high-risk environment. Leaders and their organizations remain vulnerable against crises despite any efforts to improve reliability. Slight deviations in normal operating procedures are common and expected under normal conditions and leaders need to learn to recognize them and take action before they escalate into a full-scale organizational crisis.

b) High-Reliability Organizations Research (HRO): 220 Focuses on the cognitive aspects of intra- and inter-team coordination. Organizational crises emerge and test a team’s ability to make sense of a situation, but sense-making worsens increasingly complex events. Leaders help overcome crisis by improving coordination and creating capabilities to make sense of a situation. Combined HRO and NAT can guide understanding of a crisis through investigating how leaders respond, act, and learn.

c) Crisis Description: 221 Offers a first-hand account, a journalistic inquiry. An approach which involves personal narratives or accounts of direct experience when leading in crises.

9.5. Military Leadership in Management Education

In contemporary context, it has been argued that through emphasizing combat experiences, the military is praised and, thus, militaristic cultures in modern societies and states are reinforced. However, this practice is used only to demonstrate all those hard realities encountered in combat contexts in order commanders and leaders to improve and better perform in the future. On the other, scholars have extensively written on a demilitarization of modern European societies stressing the need to replace warriors with civilized soldiers. But professional soldiers are still required to perform some very brutish, offensive, unpleasant, and uncivilized tasks. Therefore, the term warrior must remain valid. While scholars still detect a questionable civilianization of the military, these developments have undoubtedly led to an increased inclusion of civil education subjects in the curricula of professional military

218 Ibid, 182
219 Ibid, 182
220 Ibid, 182
221 Ibid, 182-183
education. Here, the concept of *Innere Führung*\textsuperscript{222}, should be noted. It is related to the wider civil-military relations debate in Europe, and means *leadership and civic education*. This term -of specific nature for German Armed Forces- is unique in the whole of Europe and is based on Germany’s post-war experience.

Military leadership and management education are interrelated. As military battles are not part of management education classroom, academic/teaching faculty need to refer to the relevance of military leadership to civilian contexts and to potential interrelations between military and non-military leadership. A simple and useful tactic would be to demonstrate, through theoretical/empirical research and case-studies, the influence of military leadership on general leadership thinking, as, in fact, a series of critical leadership practices -developed within the military- are being used as a basis for civilian leadership training. Military research, education and training have created a motivation for examining how military practices can inform (civilian) leadership, and identifying possible connections between them\textsuperscript{223}. Scholars argue that the military, in organizational terms, could serve as a model, in this case, as they have invented, developed and practised leadership for ages. Additionally, complexity and unique character of contemporary crises demand an overall understanding of leadership, as widely practiced in organizations.

The importance of military and civilian leadership in responding to crises is demonstrated, perfectly, by the inclusion of courses on management, leadership and crisis management in military Academies and institutions of higher education. Leadership development remains a critical educational element in modern military education. Military leadership has been perceived as hierarchical, strictly-structured and characterized by pre-planned and pre-programmed decision-making guidelines, pre-established analytical processes, rules, and standard operational procedures/SOPs. However, current security environment and combat context characteristics, urgently, demand a reform of the entire leadership-preparation process for engaging in and managing contemporary crises. In teaching crisis leadership, it is critical to motivate students, in the classroom, to study military examples, case-studies, combat scenarios and lessons-learned related to leadership\textsuperscript{224}.

\textsuperscript{222} German Staff Officer Wolf Graf von Baudissin, is credited with the invention of this term. See, Martin Kutz, ‘*Innere Führung*- Leadership and Civic Education in the German Armed Forces,’ *Connections- The Quarterly Journal*, Vol. II/ No 3 (September 2003):109-124.

\textsuperscript{223} D. Christopher Kayes, et all. (2012), *Op. Cit.*, 185

Attempting to distinguish theory considerations on crisis leadership, some perspectives tend to emphasize the role of experience in leading a crisis, thus, providing transferable situation prototypes, which, in turn, will serve as the basis for determining ideal behaviour, actions and decisions during managing crises. Others rely, beyond experience, on the role of personal emotions and human competences -development, for crisis leadership purposes. Such an experiential learning approach to crisis leadership stresses the influence of experience on leaders’ understanding of and response to crises. Naturally, this type of experiential approaches seeks, also, to investigate relations and interaction between experience and theory, thus, extending research on the issue. The experiential learning approach is, theoretically, consistent with research on learning from errors and mistakes, placing an increased emphasis on the role of emotions and experience, while offering a generalized approach to teaching crisis leadership. In preparing leaders, to deal with crises, the development of necessary capabilities to handle emotions, in stressful environments, remains critical.

Main element in identifying a basic guiding- framework in teaching crisis leadership, is the fact that each crisis has a unique character. Therefore, to best analyze how crises can provide a management learning and organizational behavior context, a linkage between crisis- learning literature and management- literature should be formed. This can, actually, prove useful, as, crisis and non-crisis contexts share common features: a) both involve task novelty and complexity b) in both situations, learning helps leaders navigate novelty and complexity. During crises, it can be demonstrated that the actual (real) demands of a specific context exceed leader’s learning capacity, thus, forcing him to consider those additional skills in effectively dealing with higher contextual demand levels. Proper understanding of a crisis can enhance a learning framework on how leaders navigate complexity during crises. Learning is necessary to handle differentiated or increased demands, as, in an emerging crisis context, predictability is low, and complexity is high. The importance of learning crisis in a ‘life –cycle’ mode, can be furthermore emphasized:

a) learn to cope with the demands of crisis by building learning into everyday practice before a crisis occurs b) continue learning as the crisis unfolds, and c) identify lessons learned in the aftermath of crisis.

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225 Ibid, 183
226 Ibid
227 Ibid
228 Ibid
229 Ibid, 183-184
230 Ibid, 184
The relevance between combat leadership, crisis leadership, military management, as well as their potential application to crisis contexts is further proved through recent research findings on leadership in extreme contexts\textsuperscript{231}: extreme contexts create specific learning demands on leaders, as consequences are high, feedback loops are quick, while threats can carry significant impact and place psychosocial demands on leaders. Combat, as a form of extreme leadership context, emphasizes the fact that learning -based on cognitive and emotional skills, preparation and training-, is absolutely important. Military organizations need to illustrate knowledge, experience and best practices in building resilience, correcting situations, and learning to respond and act in dangerous and extreme environments. Crisis management, in current circumstances, is a task requiring negotiation skills, novel and creative thinking, new knowledge and innovative response capabilities. It is, also, related to team- learning, as different skills, competences, knowledge and behaviours need to be coordinated, in a delicate and sensitive process. Analysts emphasize leaders’ need to exploit changes in order to deal with a crisis at key stages, particularly in cases of public leadership\textsuperscript{232}.

9.6. Training Basis

Empirical research and observation, based on theory, has led to the development of models describing how leaders learn to handle combat demands through new forms of learning. Models offer a basis for training and teaching crisis leadership, and focus on three (3) dimensions of leading in crises: a) context b) experience c) response and recovery cycle\textsuperscript{233}. Many of the lessons -learned, as constructed on the experience of those army officers who operated in combat/ war zones, have enhanced current thinking and developed new aspects of military crisis leadership. Crisis leadership dimensions are as follows:

\textit{Crisis Context:} several management concepts facilitate understanding of a crisis environment. Programmed decision -making involves routine situations where actions are predictable and largely quantifiable. In contrast, non-programmed decision- making involves situations where solutions have not yet been discovered. Research captures the decision-making context of crises and concludes to several characteristics: a) \textit{a sense that existing routines don’t}
work. Military commanders approach crisis leadership as a situation where you’ve been taught the way to do something your entire career which just isn’t working! b) *constantly shifting information needs and information availability*. Crisis situations are characterized by information vibrations: not enough information to make a decision; too much information; conflicting information; changing information c) *unexpected events*. Crisis constitutes a diversity of problems with competing agendas. It is a situation for which you cannot plan or predict all contingencies. Officers describe that you conduct a mission expecting one thing which, eventually does not happen. Preparing for the unexpected is what has been described as cognitive readiness\(^2\), where actors prepare not only for the technical aspects of a task but also those cognitive and emotional demands they might be confronted with. This concept implies that even though leaders cannot remain prepared for all contingencies and crises, they can develop a necessary mindset d) *escalating complexity*. Crisis leadership involves complexity, while emerging circumstances can quickly overwhelm actors involved. As leaders frequently note, you start a mission and you end up with other different missions. Under these conditions, leaders need to be aware and focus on priorities, as the environment responds in unpredictable ways with new challenges and opportunities likely to emerge\(^3\).

*Crisis Experience*: When a crisis emerges, it creates internal emotions, reactions, and anxieties that are, to some extent, connected to learning. This is similar to management context, where the importance of “crucible experiences”\(^4\), in leadership, is stressed. This type of experiences defines leaders in new terms (*leader’s identity formation*): individuals tend to re-evaluate habits, perspectives, and assumptions. The critical factor, for leaders to become aware of a mission and its accomplishment, is crisis which offers them all necessary emergent experiences. Emergent crisis experiences have the following characteristics: a) *sense of profound responsibility for others*: as officers frequently note, fear is not so much for them anymore, but they fear more for those who report to them. Others have a significant stake in leader decisions, while others think that every decision made will impact people. In combat, there are often situations where leaders realize that there is no barrier, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of an outcome will depend on decisions that they are required to make b) *intense affect*: crisis also leads to an intense range of emotions. Leaders comment that they feel as if their hearts were ripped out of their chest and they knew their direct reports were feeling the same thing: for most of them, this was the first time they had experienced these extreme

\(^{234}\) *Ibid*, 188-190  
\(^{235}\) *Ibid*  
\(^{236}\) *Ibid*, 190
emotions. Bit, as a consequence, they learned how to manage these intense emotions, both in themselves and in others. Based on this observation, any course in crisis leadership should explicitly address the intense emotional component of crisis leadership c) moral responsibility: those experiencing crisis situations sense that their decisions have implications on their character and their organization while their actions can be a credit or disgrace to their organization or nation. In this view, actions taken by anyone can quickly escalate to national security issue d) embodied feedback: in a crisis, feedback from decisions leaves a lasting impression on the soul, thus, embodied feedback is a critical component of crisis leadership. While traditional feedback may require slight adjustment or modifications to behavior, embodied feedback leaves a strong impression behind. Embodied feedback is never forgotten: its voice is always present.  

**Response and Recovery Cycle** this insight on leadership relies on leaders’ successful engagement in crises. This cycle requires leaders to move between two distinct modes of learning. In the response mode, they react/respond to the environment by using new routines, actions, and updated situation—assessments. In the recovery mode, they identify lessons—learned, build organizational resilience on the basis of experience and demonstrate compassion for team members. Time-frame between response and recovery varies, thus, learning cycle is not a purely rational process but a situation involving deep emotions and reflection. Crisis response and recovery phase requires an understanding of and an ability to manage emotional instabilities (anger, fear). Leaders, therefore, turn to emotional intelligence to regulate responses. Regulated emotions connected with judgment, enable leaders to behave and act based on awareness, intuition, personal principles and values. Crises demand from leaders, not only adaptation capacity, but, also, innovative problem-solving techniques, while, environments per se demand the transformation of existing organizational learning processes. In a combat context, it is critical to adapt, respond and act quickly. Lessons—learned do not, typically, refer only to command and control/C2 or to hierarchically—structured decision—making—often attributed to military leadership. Their task is, also, to explain how military doctrines have shifted from recognizing leadership as a process that emphasizes the **exercise of authority**, to recognizing it as the interaction of processes.

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237 Ibid, 190-191  
238 Ibid, 192  
239 Ibid, 192  
240 Ibid
The military Command and Control/C2 model of decision-making, decisive in WW II, became the standard organizational and leadership model for next few decades. Military organizations adopted C2 models and trained high-rank officers and leaders, however, today, these crisis leadership models appear, rather, outdated, not-useful and ineffective. Leaders, at all levels, when engaged in modern global PK, crisis-response or expeditionary operations, adopt new stances, instead of, simply, obey and respond to C2 procedures established in previous wars/conflicts and operations. Response and recovery cycle was exactly built on a notion of emergent experiences that represents new learning and adaptation thinking, rather, than simply following orders and establishing routines.\footnote{241}

However, in defining this approach some boundary conditions need to be taken into consideration:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a)] links between military combat and some forms of crisis leadership have their limits...combat often occurs within a compressed time frame, whereas organizational crisis can unfold over days, months, and years
  \item[b)] women roles in combat have continued to evolve as the nature of combat and the environment have changed
  \item[c)] the high-stakes nature of combat, which creates an environment unlike the typical business environment\footnote{242}.
\end{itemize}

\footnote{241}Ibid, 192
\footnote{242}Ibid, 195-196
Conclusion

With the paradigmatic shift of the global security environment, western armed forces have gradually transformed from primary national defence instruments into mechanisms of international and regional crisis -prevention & -management and conflict resolution. The significantly altered roles, tasks and missions assigned to the military in this internationalized security arena have demanded close civil- military cooperation and, also, as a result of the changed character of military missions, an extended horizon for military leadership. For some years, the armed forces of European nations have been confronted by a number of new, unforeseen challenges: once the threat of an imminent total industrialized war -primary danger during cold war era- was replaced by those new types of (non)war, waged by non-state actors, it is no longer of primary importance for armies to defend a state’s borders: defence of the state is now one and not the most significant, task of the armed forces.

Members of the military are tasked with missions they would not have considered a soldier’s duty some thirty years ago. Even in cases where soldiers are employed in traditional combat environments -as in Iraq and Afghanistan-, asymmetric types of warfare prevail: soldiers are confronted with partisan and terrorist methods of warfare, civil wars and insurgencies, mostly, in civic environment. Armed forces, by routinely engaging in international military missions and operations, away from national territory, have become extraterritorial, and, thus, to a considerable degree, disconnected with society and its citizens -legitimization of these missions, also, remaining questionable.

Armies when faced with these new challenges need to reconsider structures, equipment, doctrines and leadership. Carl von Clausewitz, speaking on the art of war, he referred to the fact that military leadership is a, rather, imaginative than a true scientific capability. In his view, theory should be contemplation rather doctrine. Theory should generate ability. Theories is argued are of a minor importance when it comes to daily routine and specific issues. If this is true, does it make sense to place such a theoretical consideration in military practice? Well, this could be answered as follows:

‘’...there is nothing more practical than a good theory...’

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244 Ibid, 17.
Typically, officers’ leadership education has been focusing on knowledge and too much importance seems to have been attached to the mere accumulation of it. Here, rather ephemeral educational objectives need to be balanced with military requirements of academic institutions (familiarization with doctrines, campaign planning, concepts and processes, procedures, plans, etc.). Commanders and leaders need to improve and better prepare for the future, by developing necessary skills and competences. Scholars argue that executive (senior-level) decisions are strongly influenced by the interactions and conflicting interests, and thus decisions made are likely to be based as much on relevant but somewhat vague cultural considerations as on rational criteria. Over time, education was reduced to the status of no more than management of knowledge. However, after it has become clear that military leadership/ combat leadership is related to crisis leadership and crisis management, integrating military experience, research, leadership examples/ case-studies and lessons-learned into management education can enhance the understanding of all those demands (knowledge, skills and competencies) associated with crisis leadership.

Considerable part of available literature on crisis management focuses in the aspect of leadership during crisis situations (crisis leadership): though this concept is essential, it is concerned primarily with plans and procedures to deal with the unexpected and not- anticipated. The magnitude and specific nature of crises, by definition, however, require more than planning: focus on leadership attributes could extend crisis plans dimensions by building thinking based on values, authenticity, and trust. There is a need for an informative, fresh and thought- provoking tool to improve knowledge and awareness in crisis contexts: in dangerous combat environments, human dimensions of leadership can prove more critical than training and experience. Empirical studies have observed that contemporary in extremis situations require adaptive rather than trained commanders and officers. Proper education should also embrace other dimensions beyond knowledge: capabilities, virtues, and basic morality. These qualities emphasizing wisdom can complete the picture. Wise is, not merely, what seems to be prudent, but, what will prove to be as such, in the future. It is related to considering potential consequences of all decisions and actions. Wisdom and (good) judgment are connected, as wisdom helps to discover proper knowledge.

Judgment enables a leader to understand, visualize, and decide and is absolutely essential in extreme and chaotic settings. It is an ability to make decisions and come to sensible decisions.
conclusions after due consideration. Problem solving, critical and creative thinking, and ethical reasoning, as components of crisis management, are the processes involved. Problem solving involves situation assessment (understanding), imagining (visualizing), and converging on a solution (directing). Thinking critically involves analytical, cautious, and convergent judgment. Creative thinking is generative, daring, and divergent. Critical thinking considers what might be wrong, while creative thinking considers what is possible. These two complementary processes (evaluation and generation) occur in a free manner according to views and conclusions stemming from thinking in certain situations\(^2\). Human brain encrypts experience as expertise to allow proper responses and capabilities for addressing complex issues.

Leaders draw on their knowledge and expertise in a context but in most situations knowledge is often incomplete. Thinking is a technique to identify gaps in knowledge\(^2\). Experience can be used to facilitate a new way of framing, viewing or defining an issue or a solution. Leaders can test ideas through visualization or war-gaming. Self-awareness and self-regulation of thought (meta-cognition)\(^2\) are important to military leaders dealing with complex contexts as they facilitate adaptation. To enhance thinking capacity for improved judgment and to self-regulate thinking, leaders should train on how to manage crises and make decisions. Through practice, novel ways of thinking can prove beneficial in managing dangerous and stress situations. Improved thinking strategies are expected to enhance self-confidence which allows to dare –not avoid engaging and managing complex challenges.

Critical thinking leads to considering the soundness and relevance of views and solutions in order to understand a situation or determine action. Critical thinking (an active process in situation assessment) can develop skills through practice which, in turn, will facilitate assessment and problem-solving\(^2\). Leaders can encourage critical thinking by actively leading team to consider alternative solutions, and views, or multiple courses of action. Teams that practice critical thinking will enhance their capabilities for handling complex problems. Creative thinking involves examining problems from a new perspective so that to develop innovative solutions\(^2\). It occurs by consciously generating new ideas, and re-evaluating or combining old ones, to solve a problem. Creativity represents a willingness to accept change approaching new ideas and prospects with flexibility.

Looking at problems from different viewpoints can improve personal capabilities to understand a situation. This can lead to a discovery of additional choices available and new goals. Multiple perspectives support an understanding of situations, produce creative solutions, analyze and evaluate them. This task requires openness of mind willing to test different perspectives and practice them. Adopting differentiated views can enhance creativity and critical thinking while discovering hidden assumptions can enhance creativity and insight. Multiple choices instead of static, preferred solutions or options will improve thorough reasoning: here one can force oneself to imagine what causes a speculative conclusion to be incorrect. Not all are true or correct, then determination of any additional views of a situation and methods to avoid any undesired outcomes is needed.

Army’s capability in complex and extreme operational environments could be enhanced by an aptitude (natural ability/ talent) when dealing with ‘real-world’ ethical problems. Successful (and ethical) application of military force requires a more detailed understanding of the ethical context. Army needs to equip officers and soldiers with the necessary ‘tool box’ through which they will become capable of dealing with ‘real-world’ ethical problems in complex operational environments. It has been noted that current (and future) operational environment will likely generate increased ‘wicked problems’ (already, proved!) which will undoubtedly result in increased numbers of ethical dilemmas faced by the military when engaged in combat situations. As this ethical component impacts on operational and strategic level, in a decision-making process, there are areas where an enhanced ethical understanding at all command levels, would further benefit the military:

- a) lawful actions which may be unethical
- b) partnering and multinational operations
- c) protection against deliberate attacks on the Army’s (and, nation’s) integrity
- d) reduction of the risk of unethical command climates emerging.

In an officer educational and training process, different aspects of ethics are involved:

**virtue ethics:** ethical climate within a unit & excellence of character; **deontological ethics:** ethical ought within the planning cycle; **consequentialism:** effect vs duty.

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252 Ibid, 5-4.
254 Ibid, 37
255 Ibid
256 Ibid
257 Ibid, 41
First one applies to both command and leadership, while third to leadership. *Consequentialism* can be translated as a *struggle* between accomplishing a mission/operation and doing what *ought* be done: in extreme combat contexts, ethical choice is an educated balance of competing theories. Virtue ethics - a function of command and leadership - deal with the character of the *moral* agent and focus upon *excellence* of character. As such virtue ethics emphasise the *balance* in an individual’s character: Ancient Greek Philosopher Aristotle’s *Golden Mean*:

‘...in order to apply ... general understanding to particular cases, we must acquire, through proper upbringing and habits, the ability to see, on each occasion, which course of action is best supported by reasons...therefore practical wisdom ...cannot be acquired solely by learning general rules....we must also acquire, through practice, those deliberative, emotional, and social skills that enable us to put our general understanding of well-being into practice in ways that are suitable to each occasion...’

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258 *Ibid*
259 *Ibid*
260 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics & Eudemian Ethics*
Bibliography


## Glossary

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>CLM</td>
<td>Command- Leadership- Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPDM</td>
<td>Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive Methodology</td>
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<td>CROs</td>
<td>Crisis Response Operations</td>
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<td>CMOs</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (Analysis)</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peace- keeping Operations (UN)</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department for Field Support (UN)</td>
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<td>GWT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
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<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
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<td>Political, Economic, Social, Technical, Legal, Environmental</td>
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Appendixes

**APPENDIX I:** The Military Decision-Making Process (US Army, 1997)

**APPENDIX II:** NATO Guidelines for Operational Planning (2004)

**APPENDIX III:** Case-Studies (Crisis Leadership)

**APPENDIX IV:** Author’s Short CV

**APPENDIX I:** See Attached PDF File

**APPENDIX II:** See Attached PDF File

**APPENDIX III:** See Attached PDF File

**APPENDIX IV:**

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